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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the district court have jurisdiction to enter

the orders upon which it found Mr. Malouf in contempt?
2.

Were the orders lawful?

3.

Did Mr. Malouf understand what was required of him

by the court's orders?
4.

Did Mr. Malouf have the ability to comply with the

court's orders?
5.

Did Mr. Malouf willfully and knowingly fail and

refuse to comply with the court's orders?
6.

Were the orders of the district court moot so as

to excuse Mr. Malouffs refusal to obey them?
7.

Were the sanctions

imposed

by Judge Wahlquist,

after finding Mr. Malouf in contempt, within his discretion?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b):
Notwithstanding any act of Congress that
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or
courts other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
all
civil
proceedings arising under Title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under Title
11. (Emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction
in all matters
civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law . . . That
district courts, or judges thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus,
injunction,
quo
warranto,
certiorari, prohibition, and other writs
necessary to carry into effect their orders,
judgments, and decrees. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1953):
The following acts or omissions in respect
to a court or proceedings therein are
contempts of the authority of the court:
*

*

•

(3) Misbehavior in office or other
willful neglect or violation of duty by an
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other
person appointed or elected to perform a
judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or
proceedings of the court by a party to an
action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience
of
any
lawful
judgment, order or process of the court.
Rule 7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P.:
An order includes every direction of the
court including a minute order made and
entered in writing and not included in a
judgment. (Emphasis added).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final order of the First
District Court finding Raymond N. Malouf, Defendant's counsel,
in contempt after an evidentiary hearing.
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In November 1985,

Mr. Malouf was held in contempt for unlawfully converting to
his own use $21,260.12 held in his trust account or otherwise
under his control, contrary to a writ of garnishment served
upon

him

and

contrary

to a separate order by Judge VeNoy

Christoffersen directing Mr. Malouf to hold and safely keep
money

in

his

possession

for

the

benefit

of

the

trustee

appointed in the Defendant's individual bankruptcy cases. (R.
253-258, 422-423, 444-445, 560-564).
issued

by

Judge

John

F.

A finding of contempt was

Wahlquist

appointment to hear the matter.

who

(R. 494).

sat

by

special

Upon finding Mr.

Malouf in contempt, Judge Wahlquist ordered that Mr. Malouf be
confined in the county jail for thirty (30) days (25 days of
which were suspended), pay a $100.00 fine, reimburse parties
injured by his contumacious conduct and pay PCA's attorneys'
fees incurred in the contempt proceedings of $2,200.00.

(R.

560-564).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In
Association

August

of

1982,

Utah

Farm

Production

("PCA") commenced

this

action

to,

inter

Credit
alia,

foreclose its trust deed against the Labrums' farm and enforce
PCA's

security

interest

in the Labrums' farming equipment,

accounts receivable, general
property.
alleged

(R. 1).
the

intangibles and other personal

Under PCA's First Cause of Action, PCA

existence

of

a promissory

-3-

note, mortgage

and

security agreement, encumbering virtually all of the Labrums1
personal property and requested that the court enter a money
judgment against the Labrums (the individual Defendants in the
case) and for an order of sale under the mortgage*

(R. 8).

PCA's Amended Complaint also contained a Second and Third Cause
of Action for conversion and fraud. (R. 8-9).

Soon after this

action

a

was

commenced,

the

Labrums

filed

petition

in

bankruptcy seeking to reorganize their farming operations under
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy
action was styled

in the name of the Labrums' partnership,

Labrum Bothers Diary.

(R. 405).

While in bankruptcy they

secretly accumulated a large fund of money which was held by
their attorney, Raymond N. Malouf.
the

fund was not disclosed

creditors.
proceeds

(R. 407). The existence of

to the bankruptcy

court or to

(R. 407). The fund consisted for the most part of
derived

from

the

United

States

Government

Milk

Diversion Program (the "Milk Diversion Proceeds"), a government
milk regulation and subsidy program. (R. 405-409).
Almost two years after filing the complaint in this
case, in July of 1984, PCA obtained relief from the bankruptcy
stay and filed a motion for summary judgment in this case with
accompanying
affidavit

of

affidavits
Thad

and

Allen,

memorandum.
PCA's

Assistant

(R. 71-79).
Vice

The

President,

specified the exact balance of the debt as of the time of the
motion.

(R. 78).

On August 21, 1984, Judge Christoffersen
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granted PCAfs motion for summary judgment upon its First Cause
of

Action.

(R. 102). Approximately

four weeks

later, on

September 20, 1984, a money judgment was entered in accordance
with Judge Christoffersen's order granting summary judgment.
(R. 111-112).
Immediately upon entry of the money judgment,

PCA

requested the clerk of the court to issue writs of execution
upon the Labrums1 real and personal property and obtained an
order

in

supplemental

proceedings

signed

by

Judge

Christoffersen for the purpose of satisfying the judgment.

(R.

141) .
Three weeks later, on October 3, 1984, the Labrums
obtained an order from Judge Christoffersen staying all actions
to

execute

upon

the

proceedings,

garnishments

Approximately

two

Labrums'

motion

to

weeks

judgment
and

including

"supplemental

attachments."

(R.

52).

later

on

October

22,

reconsider

the

summary

judgment, Judge

Christoffersen denied Labrums1 motion, vacated

1984, upon

the stay and

expressly authorized PCA to avail itself of such process as was
necessary to collect on the judgment from PCA's collateral. (R.
156, 213).

On November

19, 1984, all of the real estate

encumbered by PCA's mortgage was sold at a sheriff's execution
sale.

(R.

232).

The

sale

was

conducted

after

Judge

Christoffersen heard and denied Labrums' motion for a stay of
the sale.

(R. 185, 213) .
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Meanwhile in the bankruptcy proceedings, the existence
of the secret fund of money had come to the attention of PCA
and the United States Bankruptcy Court and on December 13,
1984, a hearing was held before the Honorable John H. Allen,
United States Bankruptcy Judge, to consider dismissal of the
bankruptcy case,

(R. 405)- At that hearing, Judge Allen ruled

as follows:
This court . . . has had no reason to
question the motives [of the Labrums] until
this morning, at which time the evidence
shows that proceeds from the milk diversion
payments are being held in the trust account
of Counsel [Mr. Maloufl for the debtors with
no explanation as to what is going to happen
except the argument these are no longer or
never have been property of the estate, (R.
407; Transcript of contempt hearing p.
15-19) .
This concerns me as much as i t does counsel
for PCA in that i t appears that the debtor
is using some method to protect those assets
and not pay them to its creditors* I frown
upon this, and there's been some suggestion
that counsel fees have been paid from these.
I make no finding on that, but other—but I
do make the comment if that is the case, its
prohibited by law, its prohibited by the
order of this court, and it shouldn't occur.
(R. 407-408; Transcript of contempt hearing
p. 15-19).
•

*

*

There are no assets left. Thus, the debtor
can't effectuate a plan of—a plan of any
kind, even a plan of liquidation without
assets. All of this has been prejudicial to
creditors, particularly the evidence that
came out today as to the position on the
milk
diversion
payments.
(R.
408;
Transcript of contempt hearing p. 15-19).

-6-

•

*

*

So this court concludes that it will order a
dismissal of the case unless within ten (10)
days the debtor consents to a conversion to
a case under Chapter 7 or moves for and
consents to the appointment of a trustee. In
absence of one of those two items occurring
within ten (10) days from today, the court
will order the case dismissed. (R. 409;
Transcript of contempt hearing p. 15-19).
The Chapter 11 case was dismissed in accordance with
Judge Allen's order

(Transcript of contempt hearing p. 20,

lines 5-13) and on December 31, 1984, a writ of garnishment was
issued in this case charging Raymond N. Malouf as garnishee.
(R. 253).

The writ was issued upon the affidavit of Doug

Kohler, one of PCA's officers as required by Rule 64D, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure
Malouf on January 2, 1985.

(R. 239), and was served upon Mr.
(R. 258). The writ instructed Mr.

Malouf as follows:
You are commanded not to pay any debt due or
to become due to Defendants and to retain
possession and control of all personal
property, effects and choses of action of
Defendants until further order of this
court. (R. 253).
Eight days later, on January 10, 1985, Labrums filed a motion
requesting Judge Christoffersen to dissolve or strike the writ
of garnishment served on Mr. Malouf.
1985,

PCA

moved

the

court

to

(R. 268). On January 21,

enter

its

order

requiring

Defendants to show cause why the Milk Diversion Proceeds should
not be turned over to PCA as part of PCA's collateral and

-7-

temporarily

restraining the Labrums and their attorney from

disposing of the Milk Diversion Proceeds.

(R. 277).

Judge

Christoffersen's order granting PCAfs motion was entered the
same

day.

(R.

restraining

346-348).

order

was

The

extended

effect
to

of

the

February

8,

temporary
1985,

by

stipulation of the parties dated January 28, 1985. (R. 373).
The parties' stipulation and the order of January 31, 1985, as
signed

and

altered

approved

by

counsel

for

PCA, was

unilaterally

by Mr. Malouf before being filed with the district

court so as to make them apply only to some of the Defendants
in the case and to Milk Diversion Proceeds to be received at a
future date, all without prior or subsequent notice to PCA's
counsel.

(R. 372-375).
On February 8, 1985, counsel for PCA and Mr. Malouf

appeared before Judge Christoffersen at the time scheduled to
hear, inter alia, both the debtor's motion to dissolve PCA's
garnishment and PCA's motion for a preliminary injunction and
order requiring turnover of the Milk Diversion Proceeds.
422).

(R.

At the hearing Mr. MaJouf informed the court that three

(3) days earlier, on February 5, 1985, all of the individual
Labrums had filed for protection under Chapter 7 of the United
States
2-11).

Bankruptcy
In

Code

light

of

(February
the

8 transcript

Labrums1

at

2, lines

bankruptcies,

Christoffersen did not ruJe on PCA's motions.

Judge

However, he

denied the Labrums' motion for an order dissolving the writ of
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garnishment

served

on

Mr. Malouf; ordered

Mr, Malouf, as

garnishee, to answer the interrogatories served upon him with
the writ of garnishment; ordered that no execution be had upon
the answers of the garnishee in light of the automatic stay
imposed by the Labrums' bankruptcies and ordered Mr. Malouf to
"hold and safely keep any and all property in his possession
belonging

to the Defendants herein for the benefit of the

trustee appointed in the bankruptcy cases of said Defendants."
(R. 423).

The court articulated

its ruling several times

during the course of the hearing as follows:
The court: [I] don't know what effect that's
going to have except that I will allow you
to ask questions to find out where other
assets may be, and that any of those assets
are to be held for the trustee to make an
adjudication
under
the
bankruptcy
of
whether—or as to how those assets may be
used, who's the creditor that should be
paid, and if there's surplus it goes back, I
assume, to the people. . . . (Transcript at
p. 17, lines 19-25; p. 18, line 1).
The court: To make a determination of what
to do with it. I guess it depends on the
results of his answers what you proceed to
do except that the money as part of the
order is not to be disbursed to anybody,
whether they file bankruptcy or not.
It
either goes to the trustee, or if you want
to argue about whether they are partnership
assets, whether you can proceed against
them. (Transcript at p. 19, lines 11-17).
The court: Okay. So what you need now is
an order requiring him [Mr. Malouf] to
answer the writ he has been served with
within ten (3 0) days and that if there are
any funds held by reason of the answers to
the writ, that they cannot be executed upon,
they must be he id for — the benefit of the
-9-

trustee for decision as to what should
happen to the funds, since the bankruptcies
of all the parties named, whether its a
partnership or not, individually have been
filed.
I don't know that you have to put
that language in, but at least that it be
held for the trustee. (Transcript at p. 23,
lines 6-11, 13-18).
Mr. Zundel:
The court:

I will prepare an order.
With those three issues.

Mr. Zundel: Yes.
The court:
Well, Jet's see.
To answer
within ten (10) days, that the answers
reveal assets being held, that there be no
execution on them but that they be held for
the benefit of the trustee. That way you
protect the money and the trustee can—I
assume, since the bankruptcies are filed,
that they have jurisdiction to make a
determination of what happens to the assets
anyway. (Transcript at p. 25, lines 18-25;
p. 26, lines 1-2).
On

February

22,

1985,

the

written

order

simultaneously mailed to Mr. Malouf and the court.
Three

days

later

on

February

25,

1985, Mr.

was

(R. 224).

Malouf

gave

$1,500,00 of the money in his control to his client, Duane
Labrum, and $300.00 to Ross Labrum.
contempt hearing p. 42-43).

(R. 468-470; Transcript of

Two days after that, on February

27, 1985, Mr. Malouf paid himself $6,000.00 from the funds in
his control.

(R. 468-470? Transcript of contempt hearing p.

42-43).
On March 4, 1985, the order was signed by the court
and, according to Mr. Malouf, he received the order on March 6,
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1985.

(R. 428). Six days later, on March 12, 1985, Mr. Malouf

executed his motion to amend the order and objected to the form
of the order as overbroad.

(R. 426).

That motion was mailed

to PCA's counsel three days later and PCA responded on March
20, 1985.

(R. 431). In its response PCA argued that

The order at issue here, as executed by the
court, accurately
reflects the court's
ruling
of
February
8,
1985.
The
modificatons proposed by Defendants increase
the likelihood that some of Defendants1
property in Mr. Malouf's possession will be
lost
to
the
trustee
of
Defendants'
bankruptcies and to PCA. (R. 435).
On

April

1,

1985,

Judge

Christoffersen

denied

Mr.Malouf's motion to modify the order and thereby reaffirmed
the breadth of the order.

(R. 444-445).

Meanwhile, in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases, on or
about April 2, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee requested that Mr.
Malouf not disburse any of the funds in his possession and that
he

turn

the

funds

declined to do.

over

to

the

trustee, which Mr. Malouf

(Transcript of contempt hearing p. 109, lines

9-25 and p. 110, lines 1-9).
On April 3, 1985, two days after Judge Christoffersen
reaffirmed

his

February

8

Order,

and

one

day

after

the

bankruptcy trustee's demand for turnover of the fund in Mr.
Malouf's possession, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $1,500.00 to
his client, Duane Labrum.

Thirteen days after that, on April

16, 1985, Mr. Malouf took another $3,000.00 for his law firm.
(R. 468-470; Transcript of contempt hearing p. 42-43).
-11-

On May 6, 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $3,000.00
to

his

client,

Ross

Labrum.

(R. 468-470; Transcript

of

contempt hearing p. 42-43).
M€>anwhile,

in

the

Labrums'

bankrutpcy

cases, Mr.

Malouf appeared before Judge Allen who ruled that Mr. Malouf
was diqualified to represent the Labrums in their Chapter 7
cases, ordered that Mr. Malouf was to receive no fee for his
services
ordered

in either

the Chapter

that Mr. Malouf

11 or Chapter

turnover

7 cases and

to the trustee

Diversion Proceeds and rents in his possession.

all Milk

(Transcript of

contempt hearing p. 82, lines 16-25, p. 83, lines 17-25, p. 84,
lines 1-20, p. 113, lines 5-25, p. 114, lines 1-21).
about June

On or

18, 1985, Mr. Malouf finally turned over to the

trustee of the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases $41,299.88, which was
$5,360.12

less

than

what

he actually

held.

(R. 468-470;

Transcript of contempt hearing p. 42-43, 116-117, 123).
$5,360.12

was

retained

attorney's fees.

by

Mr.

Malouf

for

the payment

The
of

(Transcript of contempt hearing p. 138).

On October 21, 1985, PCA filed its verified motion for
order to show cause why Raymond N. Malouf should not be held in
contempt of the order served upon him contained in the writ of
garnishment and Judge ChristoFfersen's order requiring him to
hold

the funds in his possession pending resolution in the

bankruptcy court as to who was entitled to the funds.
465-472).

(R.

On October 26, 1985, the bankruptcy trustee joined

in PCA's motion.

(R. 458-459).
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On November 25, 1985, an evidentiary hearing was held
upon the court's order to Mr. Malouf to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt.

(R. 512). During the hearing,

Judge

separate

Wahlquist

made

three

(Transcript of contempt hearing
157-159, 174-178).

sets

of

findings.

at p. 50, lines 15-23, p.

Only part of the court's rulings from the

bench are included in the Addendum to Mr. Malouf's Brief on
Appeal or in the Docketing Statement filed in this case.

A

complete transcript of Judge Wahlquistfs rulings is submitted
in

the Addendum

to

this

Brief.

In pertinent

part Judge

Christoffersen ruled from the bench as follows:
The court has also heard the testimony here
given and finds that in truth Mr. Malouf
knew this was a complete freeze and knew it
throughout.
He struggled for some way to
avoid it, and he has a hodgepodge of
half-reasoned through explanations, but none
of which avoid the basic conclusion that
those orders from the resident judge were a
complete freeze.
The court finds further that there have been
hearings
under
Chapter
11
in
which
specifically no attorney's fees were paid.
The court further finds that there have been
hearings under Chapter 7 in which no
attorney's fees were to be paid.
The court finds that payment of attorney's
fees on these matters is—constitutes a
violation of those orders, and is no defense
insofar as violations of—alleged violations
of the resident judge's order here. This
was a complete freeze.
Insofar as the explanation involving the
difference between the so-called $46,000
plus and the $41,000 plus, I have heard two
things:
I have heard one thing that all
-13-

monies that were owed were paid over, and
that he did—Mr. Malouf does not know what
the other $5,000 was for. Then I have heard
the development of an explanation which
seems to violate the ruLes of the IRS and
the rules of logic, and the court does
believe him. The court finds this to be a
falsehood.
(Transcript of contempt hearing
p. 158-159).
At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial
court found Mr. Malouf in contempt for willfully violating the
garnishment order and Judge Christoffersen1s February 8 Order.
(R. 520-525).

The trial court granted a money judgment in

favor of the trustee in the amount of $21,260.12 (R. 524) and
attorneys1

assessed

$2,200.00.

fees in favor of PCA in the amount of

(R. 524). The trial court noted that in 30 years on

the bench it had never encountered a case of lawyer misconduct
of this magnitude (Transcript of November 26, 1985, lines 3-5)
and sentenced Mr. Malouf to pay a $100.00 fine and serve thirty
(30) days in the county jail, twenty-five (25) days of which
were suspended upon condition that Mr. Malouf return all sums
which he still held from the Labrums1 accounts to the trustee
and

that

he

answer

questions

truthfully

concerning

his

resources and ability to pay the judgments granted against him.
(R. 524) .
This
Thereafter

appeal

was

the Labrums

commenced

in

and Mr. Malouf

December
filed

of

1985.

a motion for

summary disposition and PCA filed motions to dismiss the appeal
for summary disposition and a suggestion of mootness.
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The

court

has

reserved

ruling

on

the

motions

for

plenary

presentation of the case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
PCA argues on appeal that the trial court's findings
and order of contempt should be affirmed and that all other
orders

sought

to

be

appealled

are

interlocutory

and

not

appealable or are moot in light of the Labrums1 bankruptcy
cases.

The myriad issues raised by Mr. Malouf respecting the

correctness of the issuance of the writ of garnishment or Judge
Christoffersen1s

February

8 Order

have

no

bearing

on Mr.

Malouf's duty to comply with the orders of the lower court to
hold and safely keep the property in his possession for the
benefit of the trustee in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases.
argues that whether

PCA

an order be right or wrong it must be

obeyed until reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.

That

whenever the court has both personal jurisdiction and subject
matter

jurisdiction, the orders of the court should not be

considered void by disgruntled litigants but only voidable on
appeal.
Appellants argue that the money judgment upon which
the writ of garnishment in this case was based is improperly
entered and therefore all orders and writs flowing therefrom
were

void

contempt.

and,
PCA

therefore,
responds

Mr.

first
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Malouf

cannot

by pointing

out

be

held

in

that Judge

Christoffersen's February
prior

8 Order was not dependent on any

order, writ or judgment entered

in the case but was

issued with the intent of preserving the status quo pending the
resolution of a dispute between the parties in the bankruptcy
court, which had assumed jurisdiction over the fund of money in
Mr. Malouf's possession.

Secondly, PCA responds by arguing

that any alleged procedurally defects in the issuance of the
writ of garnishment at issue are not such as to make the writ
void.
The facts of this case show an attempt by Mr. Malouf
and

his

clients

to

jump

between

the

jurisdiction

of

the

bankruptcy and the state courts as the proceedings in either of
those courts begin to close in on their assets.
Labrums and their counsel attempted
practical,

if

not

That the

to take advantage of a

theoritical, hiatus

in

the

jurisdiction

between those courts to secret away substantial assets.

Judge

Christoffersenfs February 8 Order was intended to ensure that
neither the Labrums nor their attorney had any opportunity to
abscond with PCA's collateral until the issues respecting the
collateral could be resolved

in the bankruptcy court.

PCA

argues that Mr. Malouf understood the duty imposed upon him by
that order and that he willfulJy and maliciously refused to
obey

the order for his own gain and, therefore, the trial

court's

finding

and

order

of

sanctions should be affirmed.
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contempt

and

imposition

of

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO
RULES 9(e) AND 24(k), UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Deficient Docketing Statement
The

Docketing

Statement

filed

in

this

appeal

is

deficient in that none of the many orders and findings of fact
from which Mr. Malouf seeks to appeal is attached to it as
required by Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rather,

Mr.

of the

Malouf

has

attached

contempt proceedings.

only

a partial

transcript

The statement of facts is not concise

and is not limited to the facts material to review of the order
of contempt.

Burdensome Brief
Rule
concise,
proper

24(k) requires

presented
headings

with
and

that all briefs on appeal be

accuracy,
free

from

immaterial or scandalous matter.

logically

arranged

burdensome,

with

irrelevant,

PCA respectfully submits that

Appellants1 brief filed in this appeal is rambling, confusing,
not presented

with accuracy or logically arranged

and that

these defects in the brief make the brief extremely burdensome
to understand and respond to.
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Mr. Malouf1s failure to follow the Rules of Appellate
Procedure makes the litigalion of this appeal overly burdensome
to Respondent and the Court.

Many additional hours have been

required of PCAfs counsel to extract what appears to be the
salient points from Mr. Malouf1s rambling brief.

Therefore,

PCA respectfully requests that this court dismiss this appeal
or in the alternative assess attorneys' fees to compensate PCA,
all as contemplated by Rules 9(e) and 24(k), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER
THE ORDERS MR. MALOUF REFUSED TO OBEY.
Of the two orders Mr. Malouf refused to obey, only
Judge

Christoffersen*s

Order")

instructing

Mr.

February
Malouf

8

Order

to

hold

(the

"February

the money

8

in his

possession for the benefit of the bankruptcy trustee was issued
after the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases were begun.
cases were begun

three days earlier.

The bankruptcy

PCA argues that so long

as Judge Christoffersen had jurisdiction over the person of Mr.
Malouf and the controversy between PCA and the Labrums, he had
jurisdiction to issue the order requiring Mr. Malouf to hold
the money in his possession for the benefit of the trustee in
the Labrums' bankruptcy cases.

PCA contends that it was not

necessary that Judge Christoffersen have jurisdiction over the
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Labrums1

property

in Mr. Maloufs

possession

to

issue his

February 8 Order.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (which was subsequently
amended in 1986) provided in pertinent part as follows:
The district court shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Constitution
and not prohibited by law . . . That
district courts, or judges thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus,
injunction,
quo
warranto,
certiorari, prohibition, and other writs
necessary to carry into effect their orders,
judgments, and decrees. . . .
Judge Christoffersen was not divested of jurisdiction
over the dispute between PCA and the Labrums by the Labrums
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.

The jurisdiction granted

to the federal district courts over civil proceedings "related
to cases under Title 11" is not exclusive.

Title 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334(b) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any act of Congress that
confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or
courts other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not
exclusive
jurisdiction
of
all
civil
proceedings arising under Title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under Title
11. (Emphasis added).
This court's recent decision in the case of Rogers v.
Rogers, 671 P.2d

160

(Utah 1983) holding, under

former 28

U.S.C. § 1471, that the state courts do not have jurisdiction
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over the property of a debtor in bankruptcy, is distinguishable
from

the

instant

case

inasmuch

as

Judge

Christoffersen's

February 8 Order did not attempt to determine any rights in the
fund of money at issue.

Rather, this court should follow the

precedent of Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), wherein
the court held that a state court with jurisdiction over the
parties and subject matter (the cause of action) may direct the
parties1 conduct with respect to property within the parties'
control but outside of the court's jurisdiction.

The subject

matter of this lawsuit was PCA's claims against the Labrums for
conversion, fraud and failure to pay a promissory note.

The

fund of money in Mr. Malouf's control, while vitally important
to the litigants, as was the real estate to the litigants in
the Dority

case, was not the subject matter of the suit.

Therefore, when the lower court lost jurisdiction of the fund
of money by virtue of the Labrums' bankruptcies, it did not
lose jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case.

Personal Jurisdiction
In addition to subject matter jurisdiction over PCA's
causes of action against the Labrums, Judge Christoffersen had
personal

jurisdiction

over

Mr. Malouf.

Besides

being

the

Labrums' attorney and having voluntarily appeared before the
court as the Labrums' representative, Mr. Malouf was brought
within the jurisdiction of the trial court through notice of
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the court's temporary restraining order and order to show cause
(regarding turnover) which restrained him, as attorney for the
Labrums, from disbursing

the Milk Diversion Proceeds.

Mr.

Malouf filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining
order and order to show cause (R. 365) and was before the court
on February 8, 1985, on that motion when Judge Christoffersen
issued his February 8 Order.
In addition, and as a separate ground for personal
jurisdiction, Mr. Malouf was served with the court's writ of
garnishment on January 2, 1985. Mr. Malouf also filed a motion
to dissolve the writ on behalf of his clients and appeared
before the court on that motion also on February 8, 1985.
Mr. Malouf contends that the court below lost its
jurisdiction over him when he allegedly answered Plaintiff's
garnishment some weeks after being ordered to safely keep the
Labrums' property

in his possession for the benefit of the

trustee in the Labrums' bankruptcy cases.

The lower court's

order, however, required Mr. Malouf to do much more than merely
answer interrogatories.

He was not released from his duties to

fully comply with the lower court's order by half-heartedly
complying with part of the order.
Plaintiff's

interrogatories

Indeed, Mr. Malouf answered

evasively

deadline set by the lower court.

and

weeks

after

the

Mr. Malouf's failure to

timely and properly answer PCA's interrogatories is yet another
potential

independent

ground

contempt.
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for

finding

Mr.

Malouf

in

Mr. Malouf claims that there can be no jurisdiction
over

him

allegedly

because

Judge

not served

Christoffersen's

upon him

written

order

was

in accordance with Rule 2.9

before it was signed by the court.

Mr. Malouf relies on Larsen

v. Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).

In that case this Court

held that the rules of practice require proposed judgments to
be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the
court.

The court found that if Rule 2.9 is not complied with,

the judgment will not be deemed "filed as that term is used in
Rule 58A(c) for purposes of taking an appeal" and that the time
for taking an appeal therefore does not begin to run until the
order is property "filed."

Ld. at 117.

The Larsen decision

addresses only the appealability of the judgment and that is
not

an

issue

here.

Rule

2.9

has

no

bearing

upon

the

jurisdiction or the power of the lower court to issue orders
nor does it bear upon the duties of attorneys and litigants to
obey lawful orders of the court.

In any event, the lower

court's order was served on Mr. Malouf as required by Rule 2.9
as evidenced
order.

(R.

by the attorneys1
424).

certificate attached

to the

Mr. Malouf's accusation that PCA's

counsel deliberately withheld the proposed order from him until
it

was

signed

was

stricken

by

Judge

Christoffersen

as

scandalous and impertinent. (R. 444).
Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Malouf did not receive
a copy of the order before it was signed, he cannot say that he
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had no duty to obey the order.

He certainly had notice of the

order inasmuch as he was present at the hearing when the order
was

given.

Furthermore, he came

before

the court on an

objection to the form of the order under local Rule 2.9 and
presumably under Rule 7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P., after the order
was executed.

(R. 426).

Rule

7(b)(2), Ut. R. Civ. P.,

provides that "any order made without notice to the adverse
party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on notice."

It was

Mr. Malouffs contention that the order should be narrowed to
apply only to a limited amount of Defendants1 property in his
Upon consideration of Mr. Malouffs objection to

possession.

the order, Judge Christoffersen

reaffirmed the initial order

in its entirety, evidencing an intent to have Mr. Malouf safely
keep any and all of the Labrums1 property in his possession for
the bankruptcy trustee.
In

ordering

Mr.

Malouf

to

hold

the

Defendants1

property in his possession for the trustee appointed in their
bankruptcy

cases,

Judge

Christoffersen

was

exercising

his

jurisdiction over Mr. Malouf in the civil proceeding between
PCA

and

the

Defendants.

In

issuing

his

order,

Judge

Christoffersen did not attempt to determine any rights in or
the status of the property in Mr. Malouf s possession.

Judge

Christoffersen recognized that only the bankruptcy court can
determine

those issues

in light of the grant of excJusive

jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) which provides:
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[T]he district court in which a case under
Title 11 is commenced or is pending shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the
property, wherever located, of the debtor as
of the commencement of such case, and of the
estate.
The filing of the petition in bankruptcy does not void
garnishment proceedings begun before the filing.

Matter of

Georgia Steele, Inc., 25 B.R. 781 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982). It
follows that neither does it void a temporary restraining order
and order to show cause why property should not be turned over
to

a

secured

creditor

before

language of § 1334(b) and
Judge Christoffersen

had

bankruptcy.

In light

of the

(d) , this court should rule that
jurisdiction

to deny

the Labrums1

motion to dissolve the writ of garnishment and to order Mr.
Malouf to hold the property in his possession for the benefit
of

the trustee

appointed

in the Labrums1

bankruptcy

cases

pending a resolution in the bankruptcy court as to who should
have the money.
The present case is analagous to the case of Dority v.
Dority, supra.

In that case the court held that where a court

of the State of Utah has personal jurisdiction over a party the
court

may

compel

compliance

with

its

orders

to

convey

out-of-state real property even though the state court has no
jurisdiction to directly affect title to property located in
another state.

Id,, at 58.

Here, Judge Christof fersen used his

equitable power to facilitate the orderly transfer of a dispute
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concerning the effect of PCA's claimed security interest and
the

garnishment

order

to

the

bankruptcy

forum.

Judge

Christoffersen had all the jurisdiction necessary to make the
limited order he made.

Effect of Automatic Stay
Mr. Malouf contends that the bankruptcy automatic stay
imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 deprived Judge Christoffersen of
jurisdiction to enter his February 8 Order.
nothing to do with jurisdiction.

Clearly, § 362 has

That section is merely a stay

of "proceedings against a debtor or against property of the
estate".

Inasmuch as Judge Christoffersen1s order did not

attempt to determine any rights, in the Labrums1 property in
Mr. Malouffs possession and merely instructed Mr. Malouf to
preserve the property in his possession for the benefit of the
trustee appointed in the Labrums1 bankruptcy cases (something
that Mr. Malouf was required to do in any event under 11 U.S.C.
§ 521 and 11 U.S.C. § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code) it cannot be
said that Judge Christoffersen1s order was against the debtors
or against the property of the debtor's estate.
Laird, 6 B.R. 273, 275-276

See In re

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (order of

state court in attachment and garnishment proceedings creating
fund to be held by the state court pending determination of
rights therein of debtor and competing creditors in bankrutpcy
court

not

violative

of

automatic

stay

because

order

directed against the debtor within the meaning of § 362).
-25-

not

In the alternative, if Judge Christoffersen and/or PCA
violated the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.SeC. § 362 by the
issuance of the February 8 Order, this court should find that
it is no defense to a finding of contempt.

Rather, the Labrums

must seek redress from the bankruptcy court which has authority
to vindicate itself if the stay has been violated.

Of course

the Labrums will be hard pressed to show they were injured by
Judge

Christoffersen1s

February

8

Order

inasmuch

as

all

property, whether exempt or not, should be turned over to the
control of the bankruptcy trustee at the commencement of the
bankruptcy case.

11 U.S.C. § 521 and 11 U.S.C. § 545.

See

also In re Thomas Kerr, No. 84C-03028, Slip. Op. at 22 (August
4,

1986)(even

property

claimed

exempt

by

the

debtors

is

property of the estate subject to the control of the bankruptcy
trustee).

This Court should rule that the Labrums' or Mr.

Malouf's remedies for any alleged violation of the bankruptcy
stay are limited to those ordered by the bankrutpcy court and
will not be considered in this appeal.

POINT III
THE ORDERS MR. MALOUF REFUSED TO OBEY WERE
LAWFUL.
An order is lawful if the order issued is within the
jurisdiction of the court and is in proper form.

See Mellor v.

Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah 1979); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis,

-26-

580

Po2d

1090, 1092

(Utah

1978).

Inasmuch

as

"an order

includes every direction of a court", Rule (7)(b)(2) Ut. R.
Civ.

P. , an order

is in proper

form

if

it is clear and

understandable. See Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P. 2d
144, 148-149 (1946). In Foreman the court interpreted former
§ 104-42-1 Utah Code Ann. (1943) which provides as follows:
Every direction of a court or judge, made or
entered in writing and not included in a
judgment, is denominated an order.
An
application for an order is a motion.
In interpreting that former statute, the court found
that a minute entry was a sufficient order on which to ground a
finding of contempt and that an order need not be "made in
writing".

The court found that a minute entry satisfied the

language that an order be "entered in writing".
Since Foreman, former § 104-42-1 has been repealed and
replaced by Rule 7(b)(2) which does not require that an order
be

"in writing"

at all; rather, Rule

7(b)(2) provides as

follows:
An order includes every direction of the
court including a minute order made and
entered in writing and not included in a
judgment. (Emphasis added).
Mr. Malouf contends on appeal that the lower court's
orders were not lawful because they should

be reversed on

appeal for various alleged procedural defects.
the

myriad

issues

raised

by
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Mr.

Malouf

Nevertheless

respecting

the

correctness of the issuance of the writ of garnishment or Judge
Christoffersen•s refusal to vacate the writ have no bearing on
Mr. Malouf's duty to comply with the command of the writ to
hold and not disburse Defendant's property in his possession
pending further order of the court or Judge Christoffersen's
later order that Mr. Malouf hold and safely keep the property
in his possession for the benefit of the trustee appointed in
the Labrums* bankruptcy cases.

Orders issued by a court with

jurisdiction over the subject matter and persons must be obeyed
until reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.
Steiner, 279 F.2d

Nelson v.

944, 948 (7th Cir. 1960); see also In re

Petro, 18 B.R. 566, 568 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (invalidity of
order, no defense to contempt charge).
invite

chaos

and

open

disregard

To hold otherwise would

of

lower

court

orders.

Therefore, Mr. Malouf's assertions that the orders of the court
are procedurally
appeal.

defective are irrelevant to the issues on

Meverthelss they are addressed below.
Mr. Malouf argues that the writ of garnishment was not

a lawful order of the court because it was founded on a money
judgment which was either improperly entered as a violation of
the one action rule or not a final order or violative of the
Labrums' exemption rights.

Mr. Malouf relies on the case In re

Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 190 P.952 (1920).

The Court in Thomas

refused to hold a lawyer in contempt for advising his client to
resist the efforts of a Salt Lake County Sheriff attempting to
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open a safety deposit box pursuant to an order of garnishment
issued by the district court of Salt Lake County.

The Court in

Thomas said:
While it is the duty of attorneys at law,
who are officers of the court, to promptly
obey all lawful orders of the court and to
advise their clients when called on for
advice to obey them, yet it is also their
duty, in case a reasonable doubt exists
respecting the jurisdiction of the court, or
that the order in question was improvidently
made, to preserve and protect the legal
rights of their clients by assailing any
order in a proper manner and at the proper
time. Id. at 955. (Emphasis added).
The Court in Thomas noted that the attorney in that
case had taken steps to bring the matter before the district
court in the proper manner but had not had sufficient time to
do so when he gave his advice to his client.

The court found

that the advice to refuse to comply was given in good faith
and, therefore, not contumacious.

No such facts exist in the

present case and, therefore, Mr. Malouf's reliance on Thomas is
misplaced.

Alleged Violation of One Action Rule
Mr. Malouf argues that the money judgment in this case
was precluded

by Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1

(1953) popularly

referred to as the "One Action Rule" which states:
There can be one action for the recovery of
any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter.
_ld. (Empasis
added).
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The statute is clearly not applicable in this case
inasmuch as the Labrums1 debt to PCA was not secured solely by
mortgage

upon

real

estate

but was

secured

in addition by

security interests in virtually all of the debtors' personal
property,

including

farming

intangibles and livestock.

machinery,

accounts,

general

In the case of Kennedy v. Bank of

Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 883-884 (Utah 1979) this court held that
where a creditor's rights are not limited by § 78-37-1, because
the collateral is personal property, then they are governed by
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501 which allows a secured party a broad
choice of remedies other than strict foreclosure.

Ld.

In the

current case, PCA requested and received a money judgment and
then proceeded

to

liquidate

its collateral, both

personal, by execution rather than foreclosure.

real and

With respect

to the personal property, PCA clearly had the right to proceed
in that manner.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-501 (4) .

With resepct

to the real property no statute is clearly applicable and,
therefore, PCA argues that it had the right to proceed as under
common law by waiving the security.

In any event, if this

court should find that the money judgment was improvidently
entered, it should not be forgotten that neither the money
judgment nor the writ of garnishment formed the basis of Judge
Christoffersen1s February 8 Order.
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Alleged Absence of Final Judgment
Mr. Malouf contends that no writ of garnishment could
be issued on the money judgment because the judgment was not a
final order, inasmuch as PCA's claims for conversion and fraud
had not been determined.

Rule 62 Ut. R. Civ. P. provides in

pertinent part:
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a
judgment may be issued immediately upon the
entry of a judgment, unless the court in its
discretion and on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper,
otherwise directs.
The issue then is whether or not the money judgment
granted PCA was entered.

Rule 58A Ut. R. Civ. P. provides as

A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
entered
for all purposes, except for
creation of a lien on real property, when
the same is signed and filed as hereinabove
provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register
of actions and the judgment docket.
Clearly PCAfs money judgment was entered in this case inasmuch
as it was signed by the judge and filed.
Rule 64D provides in pertinent part as follows:
After judgment a writ of garnishment is
available in aid of execution to satisfy a
money judgment. Rule 64D(a)(ii) Ut. R. Civ.
Mr. Malouf asserts that a garnishment cannot be had
except

upon

applicable

a

"final

rules

judgment".

requires

that
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However, nothing
a

judgment

on

in the
which

a

garnishment

is based be "final" and hence appealable as of

right under Rule 54(b) Ut. R. Civ. P.
Rule 69(a) Ut. R. Civ. P. provides as follows?
Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a
writ of execution unless the court otherwise
directs, which may be issued at any time
within eight (8) days after the entry of the
judgment, except as execution may be stayed
pursuant to Rule 62, either in the county in
which judgment was rendered or in any county
in which a transcript thereof has been filed
and docketed in the office of the clerk for
the district court.
Rule 64D(d) provides as follows:
After the entry of a judgment requiring the
payment of money, the clerk of any court
from which execution therein may be issued
shall issue a writ or writs of garnishment,
without the necessity for an undertaking,
upon the filing of an affidavit of the
judgment creditor:
(i)
Identifying the persons sought
to be charged as a garnishee;
(ii)
Stating
that
property
sought
to
be
non-exempt; and

the
personal
garnished
is

(iii)
Stating whether such property
consists, in whole or in part, of earnings
from personal services as heretofore defined
in (e)(iv) of this Rule.
Clearly, all the procedural due process required for
the issuance of the writ of garnishment at issue in this case
was accorded the Labrums.

Judge Christoffersen, in an effort

to assure that the Labrums were treated fairly, granted a stay
of all garnishment and execution proceedings pending review of
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the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration,

Upon review Judge

Christof fersen vacated the stay and authorized PCA to move to
collect the judgment.

Alleged Exemption Claims
Mr. Malouf asserts that the writ of garnishment served
upon him on January 2, 1985, is overbroad in its attachment
inasmuch as it does not exclude, on its face, property of the
debtors which is exempt from garnishment.

Mr. Malouf relies on

Rule 64D(a)(iii) which reads as follows:
A writ may be used to levy upon or effect
the
accrued
credits, chattels, goods,
effects, chooses in action, money and other
personal property and rights to property of
defendant in the possession of a third
person, or under the control or constituting
a performance obligation of any third
person, whether due or yet to become due at
the time of service of the writ of
garnishment, which are not exempt from
garnishment
or
execution
under
any
applicable provisions of state or federal
law.
Under Rule 64D the writ of garnishment served on Mr.
Malouf clearly did not attach property in his possession that
was truly exempt.

However, Mr. Malouf has made no credible

factual showing that the funds in his possession, which he
spent

in

violation

of

the

garnishment

and

Judge

Christoffersen1s orders, were in fact exempt under applicable
provisions of state or federal law.
devoid

of any facts

The record

is wholly

to which state or federal law may be
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applied

to

determine

whether

the

funds

in

possession qualified as exempt under those laws.

Mr-

Malouf's

The record is

devoid of any evidence of a bona fide pension plan in which the
funds in Mr. Malouf's possession were deposited. Rather, Judge
Wahlquist found that he could "find little persuasive evidence
at all to support the contention that there does exist and did
exist earlier

before the bankruptcy started a pension fund

arrangement".

(R. 523). The burden is on the Labrums to prove

the existence of a bona fide pension plan. Geisy-Walker Co. v.
Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 162 P.876 (1916).
Mr. Malouf relies on the fact that in his answer to
PCA's

garnishment

he

claimed

that

the

property

in

his

possession was exempt and that the answer was not contraverted
by PCA.

However, PCA had no opportunity to contr avert Mr.

Malouf's answer

in the state court proceedings because the

answer was served two months after the Labrums had commenced
their bankruptcy cases and the state court no longer had any
jurisdiction

to determine whether

Malouf's possession were exempt.

or not the funds

in Mr.

By the time Mr. Malouf had

answered PCA's garnishment the issue of exemptions had moved
from the state court to the bankruptcy court with no showing
having been made in the state court that the funds attached by
the garnishment, and

the subject of Judge Christoffersen's

February 8 Order, were exempt.
when

Judge Christoffersen

Indeed, on February 8, 1985,

was confronted
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with Mr. Malouf's

claim of exempt property, he ordered Mr. Malouf to hold the
property in his possession for the benefit of the trustee so
the issue of exemptions could be determined in the bankruptcy
court.
was

Mr. Malouf refused to comply with that order and hence

found

in contempt.

It

is worth

noting

that of the

$21,260.12 taken by Mr. Malouf only $5,360.12 was taken after
he answered PCAfs garnishment.

Most of the money was taken

within a few weeks of Judge Christoffersen's explicit order to
Mr. Malouf to hold the money for the trustee.

POINT IV
THE GARNISHMENT AND JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSEN'S
FEBRUARY 8 ORDER WERE NEVER RENDERED MOOT.
Mr.

Malouf

argues

that he should

not be held in

contempt for either the garnishment or Judge Christoffersenfs
February 8 Order because both of those orders were rendered
moot during the pendency of the Labrums' Chapter 7 bankruptcy
cases.

Mr. Malouf asserts that Judge Christoffersen1s February

8 Order did not require him to transfer anything to the trustee
but merely to hold it for the benefit of the trustee and did
not specify how long he should hold the money and, therefore,
he cannot be held in contempt for refusing to transfer the
property
falicious.

to

the
During

trustee.

Mr.

Malouffs

contentions

are

the bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee

requested that Mr. Malouf turnover the funds in his possession.
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Mr. Malouf refused to comply with the trustee's request.

In

addition, Mr. Malouf was ordered to transfer all of the money
in his possession to the trustee by the Honorable John H.
Allen, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
1985,

he

partially

complied

with

(R. 493). On July 19,

Judge

Allen's

order

by

transferring $41,299.88 to the trustee, but failed to transfer
$5,360.12, which he retained.
duties)

and

11 U.S.C.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (debtor's

§ 542

(turnover

of property

to the

estate), Mr. Malouf was required to turnover the property he
held for the benefit of the trustee to the trustee without the
necessity of any order or request to do so. In addition, Judge
Christoffersen made it clear at the February 8 hearing that the
money was "to be held for the trustee to make an adjudication
under the bankruptcy of whether—or as to how those assets may
be used" (transcript at p. 17, lines 19-25) and that the money
in Mr. Malouf's possession "either goes to the trustee, or if
you want to argue about whether they are partnership assets,
whether you can proceed against them". (Transcript at p. 19,
lines 11-17).

Trustee's Alleged Waiver
Mr. Malouf baldly asserts that the trustee waived any
interest the trustee may have had in the funds in Mr. Malouffs
possession.

There is no evidence of any waiver in the record.

To the contrary the trustee joined in PCA's order to show cause
why Mr. Malouf should not be held in contempt.
-36-

(R. 458-459).

Mr. Malouf asserts that his clients claimed the funds in his
possession as exempt in the bankruptcy proceedings and that no
one objected and therefore they are exempt under local Rule 25,
Bankruptcy

Rules,

bankruptcy

estate.

level.

and,

therefore,

Mr. Malouffs

not

property

assertion

of

the

fails on every

Mr. Malouf's clients did not properly claim the funds

in his possession as exempt, they did not even reveal the
amount of those funds in their schedules.

(Def. Ex. 2).

Similarly, Mr. Malouf's contentions that his clients'
discharge
merit.

in bankruptcy

renders

the

issue moot

is without

The debtors' discharge clearly does not work to divest

the bankruptcy estate of its interest in the debtor's property.
The affect of discharge is explained in 11 U.S.C. § 524 and
does

not

deal

with

the estate's

interest

in the debtor's

property at all. Discharge may occur soon after the debtor's
bankruptcy begins and years before final distribution of the
debtor's property to the debtor's creditors under 11 U.S.C.
§ 726.

The Labrums' Chapter

7 bankruptcy cases are still

proceeding and, as evidenced by the trustee's joinder in the
contempt proceedings, the trustee is still trying to assemble
the

Labrums'

creditors.

property

for

distribution

the

Labrums'

(R. 458-459).

Judge Allen has in fact heard
debtors' claimed
advisement.

to

exemptions

argument as to the

and has taken the matter under

This court should rule that the bankruptcy court
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is the only forum with jurisdiction to determine the issue
after the debtors commenced their bankruptcy in February of
1985.

The court

should

rule that the Labrums1

claims to

exemptions under either state or federal law do not raise a
substantial issue of defense to the charges against Mr. Malouf
for contempt.

Indeed, if Mr. Malouf is permitted to abscond

with property of the bankruptcy estate, and property in which
PCA claims a security interest, before the issues of claimed
exemptions

and security

interests can be determined

in the

bankruptcy court, Mr. Malouf's actions will make the bankruptcy
court's determination moot and PCA's action in the state court
moot.

Judge

Christoffersen

made his February

8 Order

to

prevent that from happening.

POINT V
MR. MALOUF'S REFUSAL TO OBEY THE WRIT OF
GARNISHMENT
AND
JUDGE
CHRISTOFFERSEN•S
FEBRUARY 8 ORDER CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (1953) provides in pertinent
part:
The following acts or omissions in respect
to a court or proceedings therein are
contempts of the authority of the court:
•

*

•

(3) Misbehavior in office or other
willful neglect or violation of duty by an
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other
person appointed or elected to perform a
judicial or ministerial service.
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(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or
proceedings of the court by a party to an
action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience
of
any
lawful
judgment, order or process of the court.
Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1953) provides
that "every court has power to compel obedience to its orders".
This court has repeatedly recognized the power given courts to
issue orders and see that their orders are fulfilled.

See e.g.

Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882 (Utah 1979); Foreman v. Foreman,
111

Utah

72,

176

P.2d

44

(1946).

Under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 78-32-1, "[D]isobedience of any lawful order, or process of
the court" is a contempt of the court's authority.

Where a

person is found guilty of contempt, § 78-32-10 authorizes the
court to both fine and imprison the contemner.

In addition,

§ 78-32-11 authorizes the court to add to the penalty of fine
and imprisonment and order the contemner to pay the aggrieved
party his damages, costs and expenses.
The power of the court to find one in contempt and
impose the above-described penalties is sustained in the case
law.

In State v. Giles, 576 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1978), this

Court stated:
[A] refusal to abide by an order made
against a party to an action in favor of the
opposing
party
is
civil
contempt
and
sanctions
may
be
imposed
to
compel
obedience.
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In Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1981),
the

Court

explained

thai

imposed for contempt:

three

specific

sanctions

may

be

Punishment, which includes a fine and

imprisonment; indemnification, for actual loss or injury; and
coercion,

which

includes

imprisonment

complies with the court's order.
has considerable
contempt.

discretion

until

the

contemner

Furthermore the trial court

in determining

the penalty for

Kessimakis, supra, at 1092.
In order for the court to impose these sanctions for

disobedience of its orders, the person given the order must
have known the duty imposed upon him, he must have had the
ability to comply with the order, and he must have willfully
and knowingly refused to comply.
1155 (Utah 1983).
finding

of

elements.
burden.

The burden is on Mr. Malouf to show that a

contempt
Id.

Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d

is not

at 1157.

proper

in

light of

the three

Mr. Malouf has utterly failed in that

In Mellor v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882, 883-884 (Utah 1979),

this court explained that the critical questions making up the
proper analysis in contempt proceedings are:

first, was the

order lawful; and second, does the conduct constitute contempt
of court.
were

It has already been shown that the orders at issue

lawful.

At

the

very

least,

Judge

Christoffersen's

explicit order on February 8, 1985, to Mr. Malouf to hold and
safely keep the property in his possession pending resolution
of the issues between the parties in bankruptcy court cannot be
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assailed as a lawful exercise of his jurisdiction over the
dispute between the parties.

Therefore, it remains only to

determine whether Mr. Malouffs conduct was contumacious, by
examining whether he knew the duty imposed by the court and
whether he knowingly refused to comply.

Mr. Malouf has not met

his burden on appeal in attacking Judge Wahlquist's findings
that Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed by the court's orders and
knowingly refused to comply.
1068

(Utah 1985).

marshaling

all

of

Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d

On appeal Mr. Malouf has the burden of
the evidence

in support of

court's findings and then demonstrating
light

most

favorable

to

the

court

insufficient to support the findings.

the trial's

that viewed

below

the

in the

evidence

is

I_d. at 1070. Mr. Malouf

has not begun to carry that heavy burden.
Mr. Maloufs acts, coupled with this knowledge of the
duty imposed upon him, show that he knowingly and willfully
refused to comply with the trial court's orders. There can be
no question that Mr. Malouf was capable of full compliance with
the orders, nevertheless, Mr. Malouf chose to act contrary to
the orders in clear contempt of the authority of the lower
court.
Furthermore, Mr. Malouf, has taken upon himself the
responsibility of being an officer of the court, and has a
heightened

responsibility

to obey the lower court's orders.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-26 (1953) states, in pertinent part:
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[I]t is the duty of the an attorney and
counselor to maintain the respect due the
courts of justice and judicial officers.
Willful

refusal

to comply

with

the

lower

court's

orders is nothing less than lack of respect for the courts of
this

state.

If

our

judicial

system

is

to maintain

its

integrity, it is imperative that officers of the court be the
first to assure that the process and proceedings of the court
are not ignored.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(3) (1953) labels as

contempt: "misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or
violation of a duty by an attorney."

Similarly, "deceit, abuse

of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an
action or special proceeding is contempt."
There can be no question that Mr. Malouf acted in
willful disobedience of a lawful order and thereby violated his
appointment as an attorney.

Under the facts of this case it is

clear that Mr. Malouf has acted contumaciously, that sanctions
are appropriate and that PCA and the trustee of the Labrums1
bankruptcy cases have been injured by his misbehavior.

POINT VI
ALL ISSUES RESPECTING PCAfS FORECLOSURE ON
THE LABRUMS' REAL PROPERTY ARE MOOT.
On November 19, 1984, a sheriff's sale was conducted
whereby

PCAfs mortgages on the Labrums' real property were

foreclosed.

(R. 235-238).

Judge Christofferson refused to
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stay the sale on that date.
Judge Christof fersen erred

On appeal, the Labrums assert

in refusing to stay the sale in

light of certain alleged procedural defects in the conduct of
the sale.

On May 7, 1985, the Federal Land Bank of Sacramento

foreclosed

its liens on the same real property, which liens

were senior to PCA's.
lienholder

moots

Christofferson1s

The subsequent foreclosure by the senior

all
order

issues as to the propriety
refusing

to

stay

PCA's

of Judge

foreclosure.

True and correct copies of the Certificate of Sale of Real
Estate and Sheriff's Deeds to the Federal Land Bank are set
forth in the Addendum to this Brief.

POINT VII
THAT
PART OF JUDGE WAHLQUIST'S ORDER
REQUIRING MR- MALOUF TO PAY $2.1,260.12 TO
THE LABRUMS1 BANRKUPTCY TRUSTEE IS MOOT.
On November 26, 1985, as part of his order finding Mr.
Malouf in contempt, Judge Wahlquist ordered Mr. Malouf to pay
$21,260.12 to the trustee of the Labrums' bankruptcy estates.
Judge Wahlquist found that that sum had been disbursed from Mr.
Malouffs

trust

account

between February

8, 1985, and June

18,1985, after the Labrums1 individual bankruptcies had begun
and contrary to Judge Christofferson's orders.

Mr. Malouf now

seeks return of that money by this appeal.
The

money

paid

to

the

trustee

of

the

Labrums'

bankruptcy cases was and is now part of the Labrums' bankruptcy
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estates and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court

pursuant

Christofferson's

to

28

nor

U.S.C.

Judge

§

1334(d).

Wahlquist's

Neither

orders

Judge

purport

to

adjudicate the trustee's ultimate rights in the money in his
possession.

The issue of what rights PCA, the trustee, Mr.

Malouf and Mr. Malouf's clients have in the money was reserved
by Judge Christofferson for decision in the bankruptcy court.
Mr. Malouf should go there to seek relief.
Furthermore, prior to Judge Christofferson1s order to
Mr. Malouf to hold and safely keep the money in his possession
for the benefit of the trustee and prior to Judge Wahlquist's
order of contempt, Mr. Malouf was ordered by Judge Allen of the
United States bankruptcy court to turn over the same funds and
more to the trustee.

Mr. Malouf has refused to comply with

Judge Allen's order. In addition, 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(4) and 542
of

the

United

States

Bankruptcy

Code

impose

a

statutory

obligation on Mr. Malouf to turnover the money at issue to the
trustee.

Copies of those sections together with a copy of

11U.S.C. § 101(10) defining the term "custodian" used in § 542
are set forth in the Addendum: to this Brief.

See also Matter

of Georgia Steel, Inc., 25 B.R. 781, 786 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982)
(garnishee not "custodian" within meaning of § 542).
In sum, even if Judge Wahlquist's contempt order were
to be overturned, Mr. Malouf could not recover the money in the
trustee's possession except by instigating and prevailing in
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appropriate proceedings in the bankruptcy court.

This appeal

will have no effect on the bankruptcy proceeding.

POINT VIII
APPELLANTS'
DENIED.

REQUESTED

RELIEF

SHOULD

BE

This Court should not reverse Judge Wahlquist's order
of contempt.
written

Judge Wahlquist's order is amply supported by the

findings

of

fact

and conclusions

of

law

that the

Labrums failed to attach to their Docketing Statement or their
brief.
This Court should not require the trial court to order
the return of the money paid to the trustee in the Labrums1
bankruptcy cases because the trial court has no jurisdiction
over

property

of

the

Labrums1

bankruptcy

estates

and

the

bankruptcy court will decide whether the money is property of
the estate or not.

28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).

This Court should not

require the trial court to order return of the attorney's fees
paid

to

PCA

pursuant

to

the

contempt

order

because

the

appropriateness of the fees is supported by Judge Wahlquist's
findings.
This Court should not "require the trial court to rule
that the funds claimed as exempt under the Utah Exemptions Act
are

exempt

jurisdiction

property"

because

the

trial

court

has

no

to do so in light of the Labrums' bankruptcy
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cases, and on the further ground that the trial court has
issued no order respecting the character of the "funds claimed
as exempt.,s The appropriate characterization of the funds in
Mr. Malouf s possession as exempt or nonexempt is an issue
wholly irrelevant to the issue of Mr. Maloufrs contempt.

Judge

Christofferson ordered Mr, Malouf to hold the funds pending a
determination

in the bankruptcy court of the merits of his

clients' claimed exemptions, which he failed to do.
This Court should not set aside the partial summary
judgment because the partial summary judgment is not a final
order appealable order.

Alternatively, this Court should not

set the partial summary judgment aside because the issue of the
Labrums' liability under the judgment is moot in light of their
discharge

in

bankruptcy

and

the

lower

court's

finding

of

contempt does not depend on the judgment.

CONCLUSION
PCA respectfully requests that this Court dismiss this
appeal on the grounds that Appellants have failed to comply
with Rules 9(e) and 24(k), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
In the alternative, PCA requests that this Court dismiss all
issues pertaining to the interlocutory orders entered in the
court below on the grounds that permission to appeal has not
been

granted

Procedure.

pursuant

to Rule

5, Utah Rules

of Appellate

This Court should find that all issues pertaining
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to Judge Christofferson's refusal to stay PCA's foreclosure and
sale of the Labrums1 real property are moot in light of the
subsequent foreclosure of Federal Land Bank's senior liens.
This Court should rule that all issues pertaining to the return
of money Mr. Malouf has paid to the trustee of the Labrums1
bankruptcy cases are moot in light of the fact that only the
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over those funds which are
property of the estate and the bankruptcy court will determine
that issue.

PCA respectfully requests that this Court affirm

Judge Wahlquist's order and finding of contempt on the grounds
that no substantial issues have been raised respecting Judge
Wahlquist's

finding

of

contempt

or

the

propriety

sanctions imposed thereunder.
DATED this 19th day of November, 1986.
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of

the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November,
1986, I caused four copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
to

be

served

by

first-class

United

States

prepaid, addressed as follows:

Raymond N. Malouf, Esq.
150 East 200 North, #D
Logan, Utah 84321

MNZ-P947
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postage
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70A-9-5U1.
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both real and personal property.
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those provided in section 70A-9-207.
(3)

(4)

(5)

To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose dut
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referr
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided w>
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3)
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are n
manifestly unreasonable:
(a)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2)
section 70A-9-504 in so far as they require accounting i
surplus proceeds of collateral;
(b)
subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1)
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral;
(c)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with acce
tance of collateral as discharge of obligation;
(d)
section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collater;
and
(e)
subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with tl
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part
If the security agreement covers both real and personal propert
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the person,
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the person
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect (
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do n<
apply.
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the li<
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to t)
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral,
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of tl
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of th
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and then
after hold the collateral free of any other requirements of th'
chapter.

1

7S-3-4. Jurisdiction - Original and appellate Transfer of cases to drcuit court.
The district court shall have original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Constitution and not prohibited by law;
appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and
tribunals, and a supervisory control of the same.
The district courts, or any judges thereof, shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari,
prohibition, and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to
give them a general control over inferior courts
and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions.
Under the general supervision of the chief judge of
the judicial council and subject to policies
established by the judicial council, cases filed in
the district court, which arc also within concurrent
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may, be
transferred to the circuit court by the presiding
judge of the district court in multiple judge
districts, or the district court judge in single judge
districts. The transfer of these cases may be made
upon the court's own motion or upon the motion
of either party for adjudication. When an order is
made transferring a case, the court must transmit
the pleadings and papers to the circuit court to
which the case is transferred. The circuit court
shall have the same jurisdiction as if the case had
been originally commenced in the circuit court and
any appeals from final judgments shall run to the
district court as provided for in section 78-4-11
unless the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
shall order the appeal heard by the Supreme
Court.
78-7-5. Powers of every court.—Every court has power :
(1) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence.
(2) To enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person
empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority.
(3) To provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or
its officers.
(4) To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and to
the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending
therein.
(5) To control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter pertaining thereto.
(6) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action or
proceeding pending therein, in the cases and manner provided by law.
(7) To administer oaths in an action or proceeding pending therein,
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its
powers and duties.
(8) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
(9) To devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent with law, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction

78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.—The following
acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are contempts
of the authority of the court:
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial
or other judicial proceeding.
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance,
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding.
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty
by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected
to perform a judicial or ministerial service.
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by
a party to an action or special proceeding.
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the
court.
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and
acting as such without authority.
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of such court.
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going
to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on
the calendar for trial.
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court.
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn
or to answer as a witness.
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person
in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court.
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of
the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding
in an action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or
special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior
tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or
process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such
officer.

78-32-10. Judgment.—Upon the answer and evidence taken the court
or judge must determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty
of the contempt charged, and if it is adjudged that he is guilty of the
contempt, a fine may be imposed upon him not exceeding $200, or he may
be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding thirty days, or he may be
both fined and imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice of the peace
may punish for contempt by a fine not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment
for one day, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

78-32-11. Damages to party aggrieved.—If an actual loss or injury to
a party in an action or special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights therein,
is caused by the contempt, the court, in addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in place thereof, may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient
to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses; which order and
the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved
party for such loss and injury.

78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. — There
can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any
right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter Judgment shall be given
adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale t>£
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that purpose
78-51-26. Duties of attorneys and counselors —11 is the duty of an
attorney and counselor
(1) To support the Constitution and the laws of the United States
and of this state,
(2) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers,
(3) To counsel or maintain no other action, piocecding or defense
than that which appears to him legal and just, excepting the defense of
a person charged with a public offense,
(4) To employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided
to him such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek
to mislead the judges by nn\ artifice or false statement of fact or law,
(5) To maintain mwolatc the confidences and at every peril to
himself to preserve the secrets, of his client,
(6) To abstain from all offensne personality, and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or a witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with u Inch he is charged ,
(7) Not to encourage cither the commencement or continuance of
an action or proceeding from any corrupt niolixe oi passion or interest,
(8) Never to reject for any consideration personal to himself the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed; and,
(9) To comply with all duly approved rules and regulations prescribed by the board of commissioners of the Utah state bar and to pay
the fees provided by law

SECTION 101 (11 U.S.C § 101)

(10) "custodian" means—
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the
debtor, appointed in a case or proceeding not under this
title;
( B ) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit
of the debtor's creditors; or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or
under a contract, that is appointed or authorized to take
charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a hen against such property, or for the purpose of
general administration of such property for the benefit of
the debtor's creditors;

Secton 104-42-1, O.C.A. 1943:
Every direction of a court or judgef made or
entered in writing and not included in a
judgment, is denominated an order.
An
application for an order is a motion.

As quoted in Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d 144 (1946) .

§ 362. Automatic stay.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an
application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 XJ.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as
a stay, applicable to ail entities, of—
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate
or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against
property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title
against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding
before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C
78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay—
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor,
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection
of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is
not property of the estate,
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to
perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such
act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title;

(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment,
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by
a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency
of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with
commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this
title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined
in section 741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of
a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title,
arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or
securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or
securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or
settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by
a repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or
in connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes
the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title,
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this
title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash,
securities, or other property held by or due from such repo
participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of
trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust
held by the Secretary is insured or was formerly insured
under the National Housing Act and covers property, or
combinations of property, consisting of five or more living
units;
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance
to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax
deficiency; or [sic]
(9) * under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a
lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real
property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during
a case under this title to obtain possession of such proper-
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(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this
section—
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate
under subsection (a) of this section continues until such
property is no longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this
section continues until the earliest of—
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11,
or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or
denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided
under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection
of an interest in property under subsection (a) of this
section of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property,
if—

(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this
section for relief from the stay of any act against property of
the estate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is
terminated with respect to the party in interest making such
request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders
such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of, or as a
result of, a final hearing and determination under subsection
(d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a
preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with the final
hearing under subsection (d) of this section. The court shall
order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of
the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is
a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from
such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing.
If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing,
then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing.
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or
without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an
opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or

concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a)
of this section—
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of
proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of
proof on all other issues.
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.

SECTION 521 (11 U.S.C. § 521)
§ 521.

Debtor's duties.

The debtor shall—

(1) file a list of creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current
income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs;
(2) if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities
includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the
estate—
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a
petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the
date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within
such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a
statement of his intention with respect to the retention or
surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying
that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor
intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property;
( B ) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of
intent under this section, or within such additional time as
the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period
fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect
to such property, as specified by subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph; and
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (BJ) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with
regard to such property under this title;
(3) if a trustee is serving in the case, cooperate with the
trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title;
(4) if a trustee is serving in the case, surrender to the trustee
all property of the estate and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to
property of the estate, whether or not immunity is granted
under section 344 of this title; and
(5) appear at the hearing required under section 524(d) of
this title.

§ 524. Effect of discharge.
(a) A discharge in a case under this title—
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, or 1328 of this title,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process,
or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge
of such debt is waived; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process,
or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against,
property of the debtor of the kind specified in section
541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commencement of the case, on account of any allowable community
claim, except a community claim that is excepted from
discharge under section 523 or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or
that would be so excepted, determined in accordance with
the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of this title, in
a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the
date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the
debtor, whether or not discharge of the debt based on such
community claim is waived.
(b) Subsection (a)(3) of this section does not apply if—
(1)(A) the debtor's spouse is a debtor in a case under
this title, or a bankrupt or a debtor in a case under the
Bankruptcy Act, commenced within six years of the date
of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the
debtor; and
( B ) the court does not grant the debtor's spouse a
discharge in such case concerning the debtor's spouse; or
(2)(A) the court would not grant the debtor's spouse a
discharge in a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning
such spouse commenced on the date of the filing of the
petition in the case concerning the debtor; and
( B ) a determination that the court would not so grant
such discharge is made by the bankruptcy court within
the time and in the manner provided for a determination
under section 727 of this title of whether a debtor is
granted a discharge.
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor,
the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a
debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived,
only if—
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the
discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title;

statement which advises the debtor that the agreement
may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court,
whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to
the holder of such claim;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if
applicable, accompanied by a declaration or an affidavit of
the attorney that represented the debtor during the pourse
of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, which
states that such agreement—
(A) represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor; and
( B ) does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any
time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such
agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later,
by giving notice of recission to the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have
been compiled with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not
represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such agreement as—
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
( B ) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent
that such debt is a consumer debt secured by real property,
(d) I n a case concerning an individual, when the court has
determined whether to grant or not to grant a discharge under
section 727, 1141, or 1328 of this title, the court shall hold a
hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person. At such
hearing, the court shall inform the debtor that a discharge has
been granted or the reason why a discharge has not been granted. If a discharge has been granted and if the debtor desires to
make an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of
this section, then at such hearing the court shall—
(1) inform the debtor—
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this
title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any agreement
not made in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this section; and
( B ) of the legal effect and consequences of—
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection
(c) of this section; and
(ii) a default under such an agreement;

desires to make complies with the requirements of subsection (cX6) of this subsection, if the consideration for such
agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer debt
that is not secured by real property of the debtor.
(e) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section,
discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for,
such debt.
(f) Nothing contained in subsection (c) or ( d ) of this section
prevents a debtor from voluntarily repaying any d e b t

SECTION 542 (11 U.S.C. § 542)
§ 542. Turnover of property to the estate.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody,
or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may
use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the
debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential value
or benefit to the estate.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate
and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order,
shall pay such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to
the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of
this title against a claim against the debtor.
(c) Except as provided in section 362(a)(7) of this title, an
entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of
the commencement of the case concerning the debtor may
transfer property of the estate, or pay a debt owing to the
debtor, in good faith and other than in the manner specified in
subsection (d) of this section, to an entity other than the trustee, with the same effect as to the entity making such transfer
or payment as if the case under this title concerning the debtor
had not been commenced.
(d) A life insurance company may transfer property of the
estate or property of the debtor to such company in good faith,
with the same effect with respect to such company as if the
case under this title concerning the debtor had not been commenced, if such transfer is to pay a premium or to carry out a
nonforfeiture insurance option, and is required to be made
automatically, under life insurance contract with such company that was entered into before the date of the filing of the
petition and that is property of the estate.
(e) Subject to any applicable privilege, after notice and a
hearing, the court may order an attorney, accountant, or other
person that holds recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or
financial affairs, to to [sic] turn over or disclose such recorded
information to the trustee.

§ 726.

Distribution of property of the estate.

(a) Except as provided in section 510 of this title, property
of the estate shall be distributed—
(1) first, in payment of claims of the kind specified in,
and in the order specified in, section 507 of this title;
(2) second, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim,
other than a claim of a kind specified in paragraph (1),
(3), or (4) of this subsection, proof of which is—
(A) timely filed under section 501(a) of this title;
( B ) timely filed under section 501(b) or 501(c) of this
title; or
(C) tardily filed under section 501(a) of this title, if—
(i) the creditor that holds such claim did not have
notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for
timely filing of a proof of such claim under section 501(a) of this title; and
(ii) proof of such claim is filed in time to permit
payment of such claim;
(3) third, in payment of any allowed unsecured claim
proof of which is tardily filed under section 501(a) of this
title, other than a claim of the kind specified in paragraph
(2)(C) of this subsection;
(4) fourth, in payment of any allowed claim, whether
secured or unsecured, for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, arising
before the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee, to the extent that such fine, penalty,
forfeiture, or damages are not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss suffered by the holder of such claim;
(5) fifth, in payment of interest at the legal rate from
the date of the filing of the petition, on any claim paid
under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection;
and
(6) sixth, to the debtor.
(b) Payment on claims of a kind specified in paragraph (1),
(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) of section 507(a)* of this title, or in
paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) of this section,
shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind specified in
each such particular paragraph, except that in a case that has
been converted to this chapter under section 1112 or 1307 of
this title, a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title
incurred under this chapter after such conversion has priority
over a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title incurred
under any other chapter of this title or under this chapter
before such conversion and over any expenses of a custodian
superseded under section 543 of this title.

u mere is property oi tne KWU spwuwju in swtiuii nrt^aj^aj VL
this title, or proceeds of such property, in the estate, such
property or proceeds shall be segregated from other property
of the estate, and such property or proceeds and other property of the estate shall be distributed as follows:
(1) Claims allowed under section 503 of this title shall be
paid either from property of the kind specified in section
541(a)(2) of this title, or from other property of the estate, as the interest of justice requires.
(2) Allowed claims, other than claims allowed under section 503 of this title, shall be paid in the order specified in
subsection (a) of this section, and, with respect to claims
of a kind specified in a particular paragraph of section
507(a) of this title or subsection (a) of this section, in the
following order and manner:
(A) First, community claims against the debtor or the
debtor's spouse shall be paid from property of the kind
specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title, except to the
extent that such property is solely liable for debts of the
debtor.
( B ) Second, to the extent that community claims
against the debtor are not paid under subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph, such community claims shall be paid
from property of the kind specified in section 541 (a)(2)
of this title that is solely liable for debts of the debtor.
(C) Third, to the extent that all claims against the
debtor including community claims against the debtor
are not paid under subparagraph (A) or ( B ) of this
paragraph such claims shall be paid from property of
the estate other than property of the kind specified in
section 541(a)(2) of this title.
(D) Fourth, to the extent that community claims
against the'debtor or the debtor's spouse are not paid
under subparagraph (A), ( B ) , or (C) of this paragraph,
such claims shall be paid from all remaining property of
the estate.

28U.S.C.§ 1334.

Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of
all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.
(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the
interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing
a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based
upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a
case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a
case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not
have been commenced in a court of the United States absent
jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain
from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate
jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection
shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as
such section applies to an action affecting the property of the
estate in bankruptcy.
(d) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of
the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of the estate.

(b) Motions, Orders and Other Papers.
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in
writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set
forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled
if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the court including
a minute order made and entered in writing and not included in a judgm e n t An order for the payment of money may be enforces by execution
in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as otherwise
specifically provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified without notice by the judge
who made it, or may be vacated or modified on notice.
(3) Hearings on Motions or Orders to Show Cause. AVhcn on the
day fixed for the hearing of a motion or an order to show cause, the
judge before whom such motion or order is to be heard is unable to hear
the parties, the matter shall stand continued until the further order of
the court, or it may be transferred by the court or judge to some other
judge of the court for such hearing
(4) Application of Rules to Motions, Orders, and Other Papers. The
rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of form of pleadings
apply to all motions, orders, and other papers provided for by these rules.

R U L E 54
JUDGMENT; COSTS
(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these Rules includes
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies A judgment need
not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record
of prior proceedings.
(h) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims And/Or Involving Multiple
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the cntt \ oi a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the chums oi parties
only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just icason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order oi other loim
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
<laims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to an} of the claims or parties, and the order
or oilier form ot decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
(a) Judgment Upon the Verdict of a Jury. Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the
verdict of a j u r y shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there
Is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to
interrogatories returned by a j u r y pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall
direct the appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the
clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as provided in subdivision (a)
hereof and subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed
by the judge and filed with the clerk.
(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and
Judgment Docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered
for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when
the same is signed and filed as herein above provided. Tiie rleik shall
immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions
and the judgment docket.

RULE 62
STAY OP PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCE A JUDGMENT
(a) Stay Upon Entry of Judgment Execution or other proceedings
to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the
judgment, unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.

RULE 64D
GARNISHMENT
(a) Availability of Writ of Garnishment. Except as provided in Rule
64A and as authorized and permitted therein.
(i) Before Judgment. A writ of garnishment is available as a means
of attachment of intangible property, other than earnings from personal
services of the defendant as hereinafter defined in subdivision (e) (iv),
at any time after the filing of a complaint and before judgment, in eases
in which a writ of attachment is available under Rule 64C.
(ii) After Judgment. After judgment a writ of garnishment is available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment.
(iii) Property Subject to Garnishment. The writ may be used to levy
upon or affect the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, ehoses
in action, money and other personal property and rights to property of the
defendant in the possession of a third person, or under the control or constituting a performance obligation of any third person, whether due or
yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, which
arc not exempt from garnishment or execution under any applicable provisions of state or federal law.

quired.
Before the clerk may issue a writ of garnishment, before judgment the
plaintiff must file with the clerk:
(i) An affidavit briefly setting forth the facts showing that plaintiff's
claim is one upon which attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the grounds
and cause for the garnishment; that plaintiff has good reason to believe
and does believe that defendant has nonexempt credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action or other personal property or rights to obligations of performance in the possession or in the control or otherwise owing
from one or more specified third persons that plaintiff seeks to charge as
garnishees or that such third persons are indebted to the defendant; and
that such property, rights or debts are not earnings for the personal services
of the defendant, or otherwise exempt from garnishment
(ii) A bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for the
issuance of a writ of attachment.
(c) Exception to Sureties—Justification.
Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on plaintiff's prejudgment
garnishment bond or undertaking and the justification of such sureties
shall be made within the times and in the manner and with the effect provided in Rule 64C(c).
(d) Issuance of Writ.
(i) Upon the filing of the required affidavit and undertaking for garnishment before judgment, the clerk shall issue a writ or writs of garnishment directed to the persons sought to be charged as garnishees identified
u\ the affidavit.
(ii) After the entry of a judgment requiring the payment of money,
the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall
issue a writ or writs of garnishment, without the necessity for an undertaking, upon the filing of an affidavit of the judgment creditor: (a) identifying the person sought to be charged as a garnishee; (b) stating that the
personal property sought to be garnished is nonexempt; and (c) stating
whether such property consists in whole or part of earnings from personal
services as hereinafter defined in (e) (iv) of this Rule. Several writs may
be issued at the same time and the names of as many persons as are sought
to be charged as garnishees may be inserted in the same writ or different
writs.

RULE 69
EXECUTION AND PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTAL THERETO
(a) Issuance of Writ of Execution. Process to enforce a judgment
shall be by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which
may issue at any time within eight years after the entry of judgment,
(except an execution may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the
county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any county in which
a transcript thereof has been filed and docketed in the office of the clerk
of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment
execution thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as
follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application
of his executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is
for the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien
thereon.

(b) P«rposc of DockcOag Statement.
(c) CMteat of DoekcCiog Statement.
(d) Necessary Attachments.
(e) Continences of Failure to Comply.

(c) Content of Docketing Statement.
The docketing statement shall contain the* following information in the order set forth below:
(1) the authority believed to ponfer jurisdiction on
the Court to hear the appeal or petition for review,
or in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of
the Court order allowing the appeal and the issues
which may be appealed pursuant to the granting of
an interlocutory appeal. In multi-party or multiissue cases, particular attention should be paid to
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) a concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., this appeal is from a final order of the
district court, or this petition is for review of an
order of an administrative agency;
(3) the date of the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed; the date of any order respecting a motion
pursuant to Rules 50(b), 52(b), or 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure; and the date the notice of appeal
or petition for review was filed;
(4). a concise statement of facts material to a
consideration of the questions presented;
(5) the issues presented by the appeal, expressed in
terms and circumstances of the case, but without
unnecessary detail. The questions should not be
repetitious. General conclusory statements such as
"the judgment of the trial court is not supported by
the law or facts" are not acceptable;
(6) any statutes, rules, or cases believed tc be
determinative of the respective issues stated;
(7) a reference to all related or prior appeals in
the case. If the reference is to a prior appeal, the
appropriate citation should be given.
(d) Necessary Attachments.

Attached to each copy of the docketing statement
shall be a copy of the following:
(1) the judgment or order sought to be reviewed;
(2) any opinion or findings; and
(3) the notice of appeal and a copy of any order
extending the time for the filing of a notice of
appeal.

RULE 24. BRIEFS
(a) Brief of the Appellant.
(b) Brief 6f the Respondent.
(c) Reply Brief.
(d) References in Briefs to Parties.
(e) References in Briefs to the Record.
(f) Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, Regulations,
Documents, Etc.
(g) Length of Briefs.
(h) Briefs in Cases Involving Cross-Appeals*
(i) Briefs in Cases Involving Multiple Appellants or
Respondents,
(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities,
(k) Requirements and Sanctions.
(I) Brief Covers.

(k) Requirements and Sanctions.
All briefs under this Rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which arc
not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken,
on motion or sua sponte by the Court, and/or the
Court may assess attorney's fees against chc offending lawyer.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTYf STATE OF UTAH
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATIONf
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
DISSOLUTION OF WRITS OF
GARNISHMENT

Plaintiff^
vs.
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B.
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al.

Civil No. 20842

Defendant.

This

matter

having

come

before

the

undersigned

on

February 8f 1985f pursuant to Defendants' Motion for Dissolution
of Writs of Garnishment; and Plaintiff having filed a response
thereto, upon consideration of the motion and response, and the
Court having been advised that the Labrum individuals have filed
petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court, and that all
property of the partnership is now claimed by the individuals in
their bankruptcy estates, and it appearing to the Court that no
execution may enter upon any answers of garnishees given upon the
Writs of Garnishment at issue here, but that Plaintiff is entitled to the information requested of the garnishees with respect to
the property they may hold for the Defendants, and aood cause
appearing therefor, it is hereby

:-r

.:...q

....

,Jof.

56 .-AL: 541

/3>o

ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Dissolution of Writs
of Garnishment be, and the same hereby isf denied; and it is further

ORDERED that Raymond N. Malouf, answer the interrogatories heretofore served upon him with the Writ of Garnishment and
that said answer be served upon counsel for Utah Farm Production
Credit Association on or before February 18, 1985; and it is
further

ORDERED that no execution upon the answers of the garnishee may issue, said execution being stayed by the automatic
stay imposed by § 36 2 of the United States Bankruptcy Code; and
it is further

ORDERED that Raymond N. Malouf, hold and safely keep any
and all property in his possession belonging to the Defendants
herein for the benefit of the Trustee appointed in the bankruptcy
cases of said Defendants.

DATED this _ M

day of February, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

;U}ur,

u 8 J'W.54^

ATTORNEYS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the .P2rrday

of February, 1985,

I caused to be served the foregoing Order Denying Motion for
Dissolution of Writs of Garnishment, pursuant to Local Rule 2.9
of the Rules of Practice, by mailing a copy thereof, by firstclass United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Raymond N. Malouf
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North, #D
Logan, Utah 84321
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IN THE DISTOICTCOUin OF THEini^^UDICIAL DISTRICT
IN ^NDlFOR^tHE
COUNTY OF CACH& STATE OFiUTAH

ORDERED ENTERED
CASE NUMBER
TIt^.J.arffi..PXQi»r i .U9Jl...GrMi.t:...A§aG. t ——- /
Plaintiff
I

, _

November 2 5 , 1985

20842

VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, Judge
__ _, , ,

John F. wanlquxst
*••

(

.
urj
r u
Garth N. Labrum, et al
n

Defendant

, .

George Parker, Court Reporter
??**.?l*e»
_, „C. „
, _„
Dotti
Campbell
• •• •

,
1i
/
^

Court Reporter
rv*.«* ™_*ri.
Court Clerk

HEARING

Now is the time for the Order To Shore nanae Kearinp In the phovp Pr>t-it-1^d
case. James R. Brr*~ and Michael N. Zundel are representing the plaintiff.
ftny

Malmif

is

prpgpnt

*r>d

-f g r n n n s p l

frvr

f>iP dnf*mdflTit-g

rpprfiQPnfpH

Ky

QadK^

N. Labrum.
V\U-£Kce£?< counsels give opening statements*
Plaintiff exhibit ^1 is marked, introduced and received.
7*
Arguments folloxsr. Court rules that the February transcript shows that all
fiands uere to he, hold and not disbursed,
Michael Zimdol ic oworn» examined and erooo-examined. p2a:i.rit.f f cnnc3udg>g case.
HQ-FoncG o:'hibit'-

Jl

? and

n

3 arc marked, introduced and received.

T^cfanoo callc Duanc Lab run who ±3 sworn and examined 1—an^ crocn^OKaninod ,
^^Tpr^^p p7-^•?,V) - f o—are T^nrknd—nnd introduced *—«V. rocQivod*———3*^2—Jt' c\ro r c celved
a*=ter Hf£Er ar^nents. Defense exhibits H and -J-P are marked, introduced and received,
Pvay Kalouf is cilled. Court cautions him that testimony m this civil case could 1
used apainst hir m a criminal case, Carl Malouf comes from the audience to act v
•• c
arid sitfe as defense counsel. Mr. Malouf is then sworn and examined by Plaintiff counsel
James Brown.
l!r. Labrum and then Mf. lialouf are called for rebuttal examination. Plaintiff
staton that court ordoro have been violated and asks for judgment aqninqt Mr. Malouf.
Defense concludes case.
Court finds resident judge issued an order to show cause and deems this document
ic aeeurant and the Court did net exempt, anything":—ALLuruev fees 111 elLlibti Chap. 7
or Chap. 11 hearings were disallowed. Court finds Mr. Malouf in contempt of this court.
He muot turn over all fundo to bankruptcy court.
Court in recess until Tues_—£03L,

HflWiRfnCTjeaa^
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

ORDERED ENTERED
CASE NUMBER
Utah Farm Production Credit Assn.
Plaintiff*" I

November 2 6 , 1985
20842

V E N 0 Y CHR,ST0FFER

John F. m Wahlguist
**•

[

SEN, Judge
Judge

George Parker, Court Reporter
.. Dean Olsen
c ^ Rep0 rter

Garth N. Labrum, e t a l

Dptti. C.# Campbell

Defendant

*S

QQ^

Cterk

HEARING (Continued)

Now is the time for the continued hearing in the above entitled case. All
officers of the court are present.
Plaintiff's counsel, James R. Brown begins testimony. He reinterates his
clients^as'"stated in yesterday1 s proceedings.
Ray Malouf testifies (after being cautioned that he has been sworn}i. He
requests that Defense Exhibit #9 be marked, introduced and it is received.
Plaintiff gives further testimony.
Court requests Plaintiff to prepare judgment and findings and facts. Court
finds resident judge's summary judgment to be accurate.
Court finrfc o^-migh^
order to be a total hold of aM' funds for bankruptcy court and trustee. Court
finds that m violation of thpse orders. £71 .960.1? TT*Q n*-M m l.aKrnn,'c smrf
Malouf Law firm. Court finds that Defense counsel Ray Malouf, has acted in
bad fajth, Court sentences as f o l l o w Crant judgment to plaintiff of ^l.^nQ.12;
grants plaintiff attorney's fees of $2,200; defense is to be fined $100.00; Defense
is to snenri ^0 days in P.arViP r m m f y .Tail

95 A*ye

r»f f M o ^ ^ ^ ^11 1 hv ^iffp^n^ed if

all monies are returned to the proper accounts and Mr. Malouf answers all money
questions

truthfully

affpr

a 15 n i n n f p

-ro^ooc

T\oro

r>f

O V ar.tif T n r ,

fixed as Dec. 11% 1^85 at 9:00 a.m. in the Cache County Jail.
filed

^ f c c n t c n ^ r JC

If an appeal is

a hone* o f £ I ; OOP nngf Ko pncfp^

Mr. Malouf takes the x^itness stand and Mr. Brown examines him concerning
nis personal firmnres
Carl >'g,1m.if neks? for protactior for the law firm.—G^urt
reaffirms that this action is against Mr. Ray Malouf, personally.
r
nnrt alior^ release of Mr. Malouf from jail for a ochGdulod trial m Hyde
Park on Dec. 11th - 1 hour before the trial and he must return to jail immediately
aftprwards ,
Court recesses at 12:25 p.m. to resume at 1:30 p.m.
Court contactc Mr, Malouf at hio law office at 1IA5 p.m. and he lias nothing
further to add to the proceedings.
Court is dicmiscod.
.—

f=:\^A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

ORDERED ENTERED December 1 1 , 1985
CASE NUMBER

208^2

VE NOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, Judge

J??1)1. X: H^y-SLUA??

Judge

George Parker, Court Reporter

!

1J»A .Qlsen

court Reporter

Potti.Campbell

Court Clerk

c/-"

HEARING

Now is the time set for the hearing in the above entitled case. Mike Zundel"and James Brown appear tor the plaintilf. Ray Malouf represents the defendants.
Both counsels give their opening statements.
Court statec " T . Zundel called him about the judgment check for $21,000
that was tendered to the Trustee of the Milk Diversion Fund yesterday. A cashier*s
check has been obtained for that check. Court deems $l,00Qis sufficient fcr
the appearance bond for Mr. Malouf. Court states an aditional S2500.00 bond for
attorney's fees, costs and interest will be necessary.
Plaintiff calls Arlene Hutchinson who is sworn, examined and cross-examined
Plaintiff exhibits #10 and #11 are marked, introduced and received.
"Plaintiff calls Harold C. Heninger who is sworn, examined and cross-examined.
Both counsels 5*ive closing statements.
Court rules that that the bail bondsmanfcssn'tadequate surety for the hond
obtained in this case. The appearance bond for $1,0^0 must be posted bv "^ridav,
December 1^, lc^5 at n:00 a.m. with the Clerk of the Court for M r . Malouffs sta\
from iail and appeal of this case to hhe Supreme Court. The i\?^on.on bond must
be posted bv then also.
Piaintiff requests additional information from Mr. Malouf who is sworn and
examined. Mr. Malouf requests a stav 6fom the Priday morning deadline and the
reouest is denied bv the court.
__
Court recesses to enable Mr. Malouf to ro to hi g nffipp fn obtain arvsvprq ^
to ^laintmfffs questions. Mr. Malouf returns with a check to Production Credit
association for £2200.00 (interest i.s nor n^-frO . Plg-f-nfff «r * € gt-t-ompyg cm m thp
bank. The check is cashed for a cashierTs check. Court is adiourned.

535

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,

)
)

Plaintiff,
)
vs.
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B.
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUMf et al.

ORDER HOLDING RAYMOND N.
MALOUF IN CONTEMPT AND
JUDGMENT

)

Civil No. 20842

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on November 25
and

26, 1985 on this Court's Order

to Show Cause issued to

Raymond N. Malouff as to why he should not be held in contempt
and upon Raymond N. Maloufs Verified Reply and Motion to Strike
for Lack of Jurisdiction; Michael N. Zundel and James R. Brown
appearing on behalf of Utah Farm Production Credit Association
and Raymond N. Malouf, appearing on behalf of himself, assisted
by Carl E. Malouff the Court having reviewed the recordf having
heard oral testimony and received documentary evidencef having
considered the arguments of counsel and having found Raymond N.
Malouf in contempt of this Court's orders; and Mr. Malouf having
submitted to questioning about his assets and ability to repay
funds wrongfully
control;

and

the

taken from
Court

the defendant's

being

fully

advised

apearing therefor, it is hereby

BJ3K 0 8 ' ! •>;,-,[ 3 9 3

accounts
and

good

in his
cause

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREEDf that Raymond N. Malouf pay
to David

L. Gladwellf

trustee

of

the defendants1

bankruptcy

estates, as a party injured by Raymond N. Malouffs contempt, the
amount of $21,260.12 plus interest thereon from tlie date of this
judgment at the rate of 12% per annum; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf
pay to Utah Farm Production Credit Association, the amount of
$2,200, as attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in bringing this
matter before the Court; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf
pay a fine of $100 to the Court on or before December 11, 1985 at
9:00 a.m.; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Raymond N. Malouf be
confined in the county jail for 30 days commencing December 11,
1985 at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

All but 120 hours of said sentence

is hereby suspended pending Raymond N. Malouf's compliance with
the following:
1.

Raymond

N.

Malouf

shall

pay

over

to

David

L.

Gladwell, as trustee of the defendants1 bankruptcy cases, all
money

in his possession and control which may be in any way

traceable to the defendants herein.
2.
ber

26,

Raymond N. Malouffs answers in open Court on Novem-

1985

to

Utah

Farm

Production

Credit

Association's

questions regarding his assets and ability to repay the money
wrongfully taken from the defendants1 accounts in his control are

not hereafter determined to be untruthful and that Raymond N.
Malouf delivers copies of the following documents to PCA's counsel on or before December 6, 1985:
1.

All personal tax returns for himselff his wife
and his law partnership for the past four years.

2.

All documents respecting the purchase by him
and/or his wife of their home and the office
building in which he conducts his practice.
Those documents shall include all purchase
agreements, financing documents (notes, trust
deeds, mortgages) and closing statements.

3.

A summary of all accounts receivable of his law
partnership which are over $300.
The summary
shall include the name, address and receivable
balance of each client.

4.

All documents showing his holdings
holdings of his wife in IRA accounts.

5.

All documents identifying any pension plans in
which he or his wife have any interest and the
value of their interests in such plans.

6.

All financial statements reflecting his assets
and liabilities and/or the assets and liabilities of his wife.

7.

All documents evidencing loans to his wife from
him or relatives for the last four years.

8.

All bank account statements for accounts held or
controlled by his law firm for the month of
November 1985.

9.

A summary of the contents of all safety deposit
boxes owned or controlled by him, his wife or
his law partnership to the extent that any of
them have an interest in those contents.

it is further

„,->„ P6* r . C rlC

or

the

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Raymond N. Malouf
report all changes in the amount of his or his wifefs assets over
$300, and all changes in the location of his assets or the assets
of

his

wife,

to

Association

within

portion

this

of

counsel

for

Utah

five working
Order

shall

Farm

days of

expire

Production

such

ninety

Credit

change.
days

This

after

the

execution hereof unless extended by the Court; and it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Raymond N. Malouf may
be released from the county jail on December 11, 1985 one hour
before any trial which may go forward on that day at which he has
entered his appearance as counsel.

Mr. Malouf is to return to

the county jail within one hour after the trial he attends is
concluded

or

recessed

for

the

day.

No

other

authorized without further order of this Court.

release

is

The amount of

time Raymond N. Malouf is absent from the jail under this part of
this order shall not be credited toward his 120-hour sentence;
and it
is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that in the event this
Judgment and Order is appealed, Raymond N. Malouf's confinement
shall be stayed

upon the posting of

$1,000 bond; and it is

further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that collection of this
Judgment

shall

only

be

stayed

on

appeal

upon posting

supersedeas bond; and it is further

PG-v-'ige

of a

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

this

order

and

judgment shall be entered as a final judgment upon its execution,
there being no just reason for delay./0
DATED this _Z>

day of

V

.-985.

BY TJHE COtfRT:

L/JOHN- r. WAHEQO*
District Court Judge 7
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'

I hereby certify that on the &-ty^-~day of November 1985
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Holding
Raymond N. Malouf in Contempt and Judgment to be served pursuant
to local rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practicef by first class United
States mailf postage prepaidf addressed as follows:
Raymond N. Malouf, Esq.
and Carl E. Malouf, Esq.
Malouf Law Offices
150 East 200 North, #D
Logan, Utah 84321

and
David L. Gladwell, Esq.
Trustee of the Labrum Bankruptcy Cases
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

»" 06^397

RECEIVED
ir.5 CE: 11 rr-1,- hi
JAMES R. BROWN (#456)
MICHAEL N. ZUNDEL (#3755)
Win. SHANE TOPHAM (#4425)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
370 East South Temple, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B.
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al,

Civil No. 20842

Defendants.

A hearing on Utah Farm Production Credit Association's
Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Raymond N. Malouf
Should Not Be Held in Contempt was held before the Honorable John
F. Wahlquist on November 25, 1985.

Plaintiff (hereinafter "PCA")

was represented by counsel, James R. Brown and Michael N. Zundel.
Raymond N. Malouf Jr., ("Mr. Malouf"), was represented by himself
with

Carl

testimony

E. Malouf
and

assisting.

received

The Court having heard oral

documentary

evidence,

and

having

^OW-LH'

reconsidered its original orders to Mr. Maloufr and being fully
advised in the premisesf now makes the following
FINDINGS OP PACT
1.
Association

In August
("PCA")

of 1982,

commenced

Utah

this

Farm

Production

action

tof

inter

Credit
aliar

foreclose its mortgage against the defendant's farm.
2.

Thereafter, defendants filed for bankruptcy under

Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Codef in the United
States

Bankruptcy

Court

for

the

District

of

Utahr

Northern

Division.
3.

Mr. Malouf acted as counsel for the defendants in

their bankruptcy proceedings as well as in this case, and during
the bankruptcy proceedings Mr. Malouf was denied all of his fees.
Nothing

occurred

in

the

bankruptcy

proceedings

which

would

justify Mr. Malouf in drawing attorney's fees from the debtor's
funds in his possession.
4.

During the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, PCA obtained

a lift of the automatic stay to proceed against the defendants in
this action.

On September 20, 1984, partial summary judgment was

entered in favor of PCA and against the Labrum defendants for
$599f054.60 principalf

together

with

interest

thereon in the

amount of $102,512.61 plus interest accruing after the date of
judgment at the rate of 12% per annum.
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5.

After

the entry

of

the court's summary

judgment

against defendants, PCA attempted to execute on its collateral,
consisting of both real and personal property. Mr. Malouf filed
numerous

motions

attempting

to

delay

plaintiff's

legitimate

efforts to realize the benefits of its collateral and satisfy the
judgment entered herein.
6.

On December 13, 1984, defendants testified before

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah that
their counsel, Mr. Malouf, held $108,000 in his trust account on
their behalf.
bankruptcy

At the hearing, Mr. Malouf was admonished by the

court to advise the court if the testimony of his

clients was not true.
testimony.

At

the

Mr. Malouf declined to refute his clients
hearing,

Mr. Malouf

was advised

by

the

bankruptcy court that it would be illegal for him to take any
fees for his involvement in the bankruptcy case from defendants1
funds then in his possession.

The bankruptcy court also ordered

at the hearing that the defendants1 Chapter 11 bankruptcy case be
dismissed effective December 24, 1984.
7.

On January 2, 1985, PCA caused a Writ of Garnishment

to be served upon Mr. Malouf.

Said Writ of Garnishment commanded

Mr. Malouf "not to pay any debt due or to become due to the
defendants and to retain possession and control of all personal
property,

effects

and

choses

in

action

of

defendants

further order of this Court."

L*
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Thereafterf

Mr, Malouf filed an objection to the

Writ of Garnishment and a motion to vacate the Writ.
9.
Restraining
attorneyr

On January 21, 1985, this Court issued a Temporary
Order

restraining

Mr. Malouff

as

defendants1

from in any way disposing of milk diversion moneyf

belonging to the defendantsr
Government.

received from the United States

The order also ordered Mr. Malouf to appear and show

cause why the milk diversion money in his possession should not
be turned over to PCA.

The effect of the Temporary Restraining

Order was extended past the usual ten-day period by stipulation
of the parties and an

order of this Court until February 8f

1985.
10. On February 5, 1985f defendants filed petitions in
bankruptcy commencing Chapter 7 liquidation cases, and a trustee
was

appointed

to

administer

all

of

the

debtors'

property,

including the money in Mr. Malouffs possession.
11. On February 8f 1985 f the parties came before this
Court on the Court's order to Mr. Malouf to show cause why the
milk diversion money in his possession should not be turned over
to

PCA,

and

upon

Mr.

Maloufs

objection

Garnishment and motion to vacate the Writ.

to

the

Writ

of

At the hearing Mr.

Malouf asserted the bankruptcy of the defendants as a defense to
any order of turnover.

OK

12.

Upon consideration of Mr. Malouf's representations,

this Court ordered Mr. Malouf to fully and completely answer the
interrogatories previously served upon him with PCA's Writ of
Garnishment and to "hold and safely keep any and all property in
his possession belonging to the defendants herein for the benefit
of

the

trustee

appointed

in

the

bankruptcy

cases

of

said

Defendants."
13.

On February 22, 1985, the proposed written order

was simultaneously mailed to Mr. Malouf and the Court by PCA's
counsel.

Three days later, on February 25f 1985f Mr. Malouf gave

$1,500 of the money in his control to his client, Duane Labrum,
and $300 to Ross Labrum.
1985, Mr. Malouf

paid

Two days after that, on February 27,
himself

$6,000 from the funds

in his

control.
14.

On March 4, 1985, the order was signed by the court

and Mr. Malouf, and Mr. Malouf received the order on March 6,
1985.
15.

On about March 12, 1985f Mr, Malouf filed a motion

to amend the order and objected to the form of the order as
overbroad.
16.

On March 22f 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another

$600 to his client, Duane Labrum.
17.

On April 1, 1985, this Court denied Mr. Malouf's

motion to modify the order and thereby reaffirmed the breadth of
the order*

18.
disbursed

Two

another

days

laterf

$lf500

thirteen days after thatf

on

to

his

April

3f

clientf

1985 f
Duane

Mr. Malouf
Labrumr

and

on April 16, 1985, Mr. Malouf took

another $3,000 for his law firm.
19.

On May 6, 1985, Mr. Malouf disbursed another $3f000

to his client, Ross Labrum.

In addition, between May 16, 1985

and June 18, 1985, Mr. Malouf took an additional $5,360.12 in
fees from the defendants' funds in his possession.
20.

All the money disbursed was disbursed by Mr. Malouf

or his partner, Carl E. Malouf, and was disbursed from his law
firm trust account or other funds he controlled on the date of
the garnishment and - the dates of the Court1 s oral and written
orders.
21.

During the defendants Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases,

on May 30, 1985, Mr. Malouf was denied all fees in both the
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases by the United States
Bankruptcy Court.
a

legitimate

Mr. Malouf did not have and does not now have

claim

against

the

defendants1

funds

in

his

possession for fees earned during the pendency of the defendants1
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.
22.

During the defendants' bankruptcy proceedings and

during these proceedings Mr. Malouf has argued that the funds in
his control are immune from execution or other process of this
Court or any other court because they are exempt under state and
federal law as part of a pension plan of some sort.

This Court
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has no evidence from which it can find that any sort of a pension
plan was created prior to the defendants1 bankruptcies or with
the consent of the bankruptcy court after their bankruptcies were
filed and this Court finds that none was created. 'Mr. Malouf has
not been candid with this Court in explaining the source of funds
in his possession.

This Court's Order to Show Cause has been

defended by Mr. Malouf in bad faith.
23.

The trustee of the defendants' bankruptcy cases,

David L. Gladwell, has joined with PCA in its motion requesting
this Court to issue its order to show cause to Mr. Malouf why he
should not be held in contempt.
24.

Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the

order of this Court set forth in the Writ of Garnishment served
upon him January 2, 1985.
25.

Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the

Court's oral order of February 8f 1985.
26.

Mr. Malouf knew the duty imposed upon him by the

Court's written order and understood the breadth of all of the
Court's orders.
27.

Mr. Malouf

had

the ability

to comply

with

the

Court's orders to hold the defendants' property in his possession
until

further

order

of the Court or for the benefit of the

trustee, as those court orders required him to do.
28.

Mr.

Malouf

willfully

and

knowingly

refused

to

comply with this Court's orders and has knowingly and willfully
refused to comply with orders of other courts respecting his
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duties,

vis

a

visf

the

defendants1

property

held

in

his

possession.
29.

Mr. Malouf is in contempt of this Court's order as

set forth in the Writ of Garnishment served upon him and of this
Court1s order of February 8, 1985.
30.

The trustee of the defendants1 bankruptcy case has

been injured in the amount of $21f260.12 by Mr. Malouffs willful
disobedience of this Court's February 8th order and contemptuous
conduct.
31.

PCAf

has

been

injured

by

Mr. Malouf1 s willful

disobedience of this Court's orders and contemptuous conduct and
is. entitled

to

its

attorneys

fees

in the amount

of

$2/200

incurred in bringing its motion for an order to show cause and in
participating in these proceedings.
32.

There is no just

reason to delay

the entry or

effect of this order.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The

order

contained

in

the Writ

of

Garnishment

served upon Mr. Malouf on January 2, 1985, was a lawful order of
this Court.
2.

The order to Mr. Malouf on February 8f 1985, to hold

and safely keep any and all property in his possession belonging
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to the defendants for the benefit of the trustee appointed in the
defendants1 bankruptcy cases was a lawful order of this Court.
3.

Mr. Malouf1s willful disobedience of this Court's

orders is contemptuous.
4.

David

L.

Gladwell,

trustee

of

the

defendants1

Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, is entitled to recover damages from
Mr. Malouf in the amount of $21,260.12.
5.

PCA is entitled to recover

reasonable attorney's

fees and costs incurred in these contempt proceedings in the
amount of $2f200.
6.

Mr. Malouf should be ordered to pay on or before

December 11, 1985 at 9:00 a.m. a fine to the Court in the amount
of $100.
7.

Mr. Malouf should be ordered confined in the county

jail for 30 days, 25 days of that confinement to be suspended
upon

condition

trusteef

that

he

pays

over

to David

L. Gladwell, as

all sums which he still holds which are in any way

traceable to monies drawn from the defendants1 accounts in his
possession and control and upon the further condition that Mr.
Malouf truthfully answer questions concerning his resources to
repay the funds unlawfully taken by him and upon the condition
that he provide the following documents to PCA's counsel on or
before the close of business December 6, 1985:
a.

All personal tax returns for himself, his wife
and his law partnership for the past four
years.
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8.

b.

All documents respecting the purchase by him
and/or his wife of his home and the office
building in which he conducts his practice.
Those documents shall include all purchase
agreements, financing documents (notes, trust
deeds, mortgages) and closing statements.

c.

A summary of all accounts receivable of his
law partnership which are over $300.
The
summary shall include the name, address and
receivable balance of each client.

d.

All documents showing his holdings
holdings of his wife in IRA accounts.

e.

All documents identifying any pension plans in
which he or his wife have any interest and
the value of their interests in such plans.

f.

All financial statements reflecting his assets
and
liabilities
and/or
the
assets
and
liabilities of his wife.

g.

All documents
from him or
years.

h.

All bank account statements for accounts held
or controlled by his law firm for the month of
November 1985.

i.

A summary of the contents of all safety deposit
boxes owned or controlled by him, his wife or
his law partnership to the extent that any
of them have an interest in those contents.

or

the

evidencing loans to his wife
relatives for the last four

In the event this Judgment and Order is appealed,

Mr. Malouf's confinement should be stayed upon the posting of a
$1,000 bond.
9.

Collection of this Order should proceed upon entry

and should not be stayed on appeal unless a supersedeas bond is
posted.

PR'V.r *'\Q!

DATED t h i s

/n

day of

/BY THfe

"7

/

H Ai

j^tetofeW'-

Fl^&HEQl
ct Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

^

/

I hereby certify that on the ,^-f—day of November 1985
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law to be served pursuant to local rule
2.9 of the Rules of Practice, by first class United States mail,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Raymond N. Malouff Esq.
and Carl E. Malouf, Esq.
Malouf Law Offices
150 East 200 North, #D
Loganf Utah 84321
and
David L. Gladw'ell, Esq.
Trustee of the Labrum Bankruptcy Cases
2610 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1

2
3

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,

4

PLAINTIFF,
5

VS.

)

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

)

CIVIL NO. 20842

6

GARTH N. LABRUM, ET AL • /
7

DEFENDANTS.
8
9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED - rHAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY

11
12

1

FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, JUDGE,

13

SITTING AT LOGAN, UTAH ON THE 25TH AND 26TH DAYS OF

14

NOVEMBER, 1985 AND THE 5TH, 11TH, AND 16TH DAYS OF

15

DECEMBER, 1985.

16

WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:

17
18
19
20

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JAMES R. BROWN
MICHAEL N. ZUNDEL
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SUITE 401
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

FOR THE DEFE^NIDANTS:

RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.
CARL MALOUF
150 EAST 200 NORTH
SUITE D
LOGAN, UTAH 84321

21
22
23
24
25

D E A N C. O L S E N ,

mo JUN35I986

1

C.S..,.

6Q5 MUNICIPAL BLDG.
D G D E N , UTAH B4.4-D1

$ | t H S» AU£M| O B H I
i*CK3TCi

Deputy
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1

TO T E S T I F Y RIGHT NOW,

2

TO T E S T I F Y TO T H O S E THINGS.

3
4

THE COURT:

I AM P R E P A R E D TO CALL HIM A S A W I T N E S S

DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT ME TO

KNOW B E F O R E I S T A R T H E A R I N G E V I D E N C E , IF I DO'1

5

MR. M A L O U F :

WE HAVE C O P I E S OF T H E B A N K R U P T C Y

6

S C H E D U L E S AND C L A I M S FOR E X E M P T I O N S THAT A R E P E R T I N E N T TO T H I S

7

ISSUE, WHICH W E ' R E GOING TO OFFER.

8

W I L L T E S T I F Y A S TO THE E X I S T E N C E OF T H E F A R M BOY P E N S I O N

9

P R O G R A M THAT W A S E S T A B L I S H E D AND HE W A S A T R U S T E E OF IT.

AND I H A V E CARL M A L O U F WHO

10

THE COURT:

OKAY.

11

MR. M A L O U F :

I D O N ' T THINK SO, YOUR HONOR.

12

THE C O U R T :

C O U R T WILL BE IN R E C E S S F I V E M I N U T E S TO

13

READ E X H I B I T 1.

14

IS T H E R E A N Y T H I N G E L S E ?

(WHEREUPON T H E COURT TOOK A B R I E F RECESS. )

15

THE COURT:

16 RULINGS.

T H E C O U R T ' S P R E P A R E D TO M A K E C E R T A I N

THE COURT RULES AS F O L L O W S :

THE FEBRUARY

17 C O N V I N C E S THE C O U R T B E Y O N D ANY QUESTION.

TRANSCRIPT

MR. M A L O U F W A S

18 P R E S E N T IN THE COURTROOM AND THE J U D G E DID HOLD ALL F U N D S
19

HELD.

20

DID NOT M A K E ANY LIMITATION.

21

HOLD.

22

A S HE C O M E S TO THE BENCH AT THIS TIML, T H I S IS THE LAW Or THE

23

STATE.

24
25

HE DID NOT E X E M P T ANY F U N D S F R E E OF G A R N I S H M E N T .

HE

IT'S f) C O M P L E T E ORDER FOR A

RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, AS FAR AS T H I S J U D G E IS C O N C E R N E D ,

YOU HAVE ft RIGHT TO PROCEED ON YOUR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.
DO YOU H A V E FURTHER

EVIDENCE?
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1

VERSUS KERSHAW, WHICH IS FOUND AT 627 P. 2d 1981, A DECISION

2

WRITTEN BY JUSTICE OAKS, WHICH THEY WERE ARGUING WHETHER OR

3

NOT THE —

4

WAS AN IMPOSSIBILITY OR WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER WAS UNCLEAR

5

IN ANY MANNER.

6

WERE APPLICABLE, AND THEREFORE IF YOU DIDN'T RAISE THE

7

IMPOSSIBILITY AT THE TIME, AND THEY DIDN'T, OR IF YOU DIDN'T

8

HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING, THEN IF THE ORDER IS CLEAR ON ITS

9

FACE, THEN IT'S GOT TO BE ENFORCED AND YOU CAN BE HELD IN

AND THE ONLY ISSUE THERE WAS WHETHER OR NOT THERE

AND THE COURT HELD NEITHER OF THOSE THINGS

10

CONTEMPT OF COURT.

11

UNDER THIS VERY STATUTE THAT WE'VE SOUGHT TODAY, AND HELD THAT

12

NOT ONLY FOR THE JUDGMENT AS WE'VE SOUGHT HERE TODAY, BUT

13

ATTORNEY'S FEES AS WELL, AND FOR PUNISHMENT AS IN CONTEMPT.

14

SUBMIT THAT THAT CASE IS DIRECTLY IN POINT, AND THEREFORE

15

WE'RE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT.

16

THE COURT:

AND THEY WERE HELD IN CONTETMPT OF COURT

I

THANK YOU.

THE COURT FINDS THE FACTS AS FOLLOWS:

17

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE DID ISSUE AN ORDER TO

18

SHOW CAUSE.

19

CAUSE AND DOES NOT FIND IT AS AMBIGUOUS.

20

IT IS IN SUBSTANCE A COMPLETE FREEZE OF ALL FUNDS HELD BY MR.

21

MALOUF.

22

GARNISHMENT JUDGMENTS GO OUT AND THEY SAY EXEMPT FOR EXEMPT

23

PROPERTIES.

24

THIS IS NOT COMMON WHERE IT'S AFTER OTHER FUNDS AND IT

25

FREQUENTLY WILL FREEZE OTHER FUNDS IN TOTAL.

THAT THE COURT HAS LOOKED AT THE ORDER TO SHOW
THE COURT FINDS THAT

THE COURT KNOWS AND APPRECIATES THAT VERY OFTEN

THIS IS VERY COMMON WHERE YOU ARE AFTER WAGES.

THE COURT DOES
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1

NOT DEEM THAT DOCUMENT TO HAVE BEEN AMBIGUOUS.

2

COMPLETE FREEZE.

3

AND IT WAS A

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER IT WAS A

4

COMPLETE FREEZE OR IN SOME WAY A LESSER THAN A COMPLETE FREEZE

5

AND WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS JURISDICTION HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF

6

BY THE RESIDENT JUDGE, AND AS FAR AS THE COURT IS CONCERNED,

7

THOSE ITEMS ARE PART OF THE LAW OF THE CASE BEFORE THIS

8

PROCEEDING STARTED.

9

SAID IN THE FEBRUARY HEARING THAT THAT WOULD —

I FIND THAT JUDGE CHRISTOFFERSEN WHEN HE
HE DID NOT

10

EXEMPT PROPERTIES THAT MIGHT BE CLAIMED TO BE A EXEMPT FROM

11

THE ORDER, THAT IT WAS CONTINUED, AND I DO NOT THINK IT IS

12

AMBIGUOUS FROM THE TRANSCRIPT AT ALL THAT THIS IS A COMPLETE

13

FREEZE.

14

WHAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE SftlD.

15

I CANNOT SEE ANY OTHER REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF

THE COURT'S LOOKED ftT THE JUDGMENT ftS HE FINALLY ENTERED

16

IT, AND THE COURT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S

17

FINftL ORDER IS AMBIGUOUS.

18

CLEAR.

19

THE COURT INTERPRETS IT TO BE VERY

IT IS ft COMPLETE FREEZE.

THE COURT HAS ALSO HEARD THE TESTIMONY HERE GIVEN ftND

20

FINDS THftT IN TRUTH MR. MftLOUF KNEW THIS WftS ft COMPLETE FREEZE

21

ftND KNEW IT THROUGHOUT.

22

IT, AND HE HftS ft HODGEPODGE OF HftLF-REftSONED THROUGH

23

EXPLANATIONS, BUT NONE OF WHICH AVOID THE BASIC CONCLUSION

24

THAT THOSE ORDERS FROM THE RESIDENT JUDGE WERE A COMPLETE

25

FREEZE.

HE'S STRUGGLED FOR SOME WftY TO ftVOID
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THE COURT FINDS FURTHER THAT THERE HAVE BEEN HEARINGS

]
2

UNDER CHAPTER 11 IN WHICH SPECIFICALLY NO ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE

3

PAID.

4

UNDER CHAPTER 7 IN WHICH NO ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE TO BE PAID.

5

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN HEARINGS

THE COURT FINDS THAT PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES ON THESE

6

MATTERS IS —

CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF THOSE ORDERS, AND IS

7

NO DEFENSE INSOFAR AS VIOLATIONS OF —

8

THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S ORDER HEREIN.

9

FREEZE.

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF

THIS WAS A COMPLETE

10

INSOFAR AS THE EXPLANATION INVOLVING THE DIFFERENCE

11

BETWEEN THE SO-CALLED 46,000 PLUS AND THE 41,000 PLUS, I HAVE

?2

HEARD TWO THINGSt

13

WERE OWED WERE PAID OVER, AND THAT HE DID —

14

NOT KNOW WHAT THE OTHER 5,000 WAS FOR.

15

DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXPLANATION WHICH SEEMS TO VIOLATE THE RULES

16

OF THE IRS AND THE RULES OF LOGIC, AND THE COURT DOES NOT

17

BELIEVE HIM.

I'VE

HEARD ONE THING THAT ALL MONEYS THAT

MR. MALOUF DOES

THEN I HAVE HEARD THE

THE CPURT FINDS THIS TO BE A FALSEHOOD.

18

THE COURT DOES FIND MR. MALOUF IN CONTEMPT.

19

I FIND THAT ATTORNEYS' FEES WILL BE AWARDED AGAINST HIM

20

AND SANCTIONS OF OTHER NATURES WILL BE IMPOSED.^ ALSO, HE MUST

21

BE AWARE THAT HE CONTINUES TO BE UNDER THE RESIDENT JUDGE'S

22 |

VALID ORDER, THAT HE MUST TURN OVER ANY FUNDS HE HAS TO THE

23

TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.

24
25

THE COURT NOW SITS IN A UNIQUE POSITION AT NEARLY 5:00
O'CLOCK OF BEING IN THE POSITION WHERE IT'S SIMILAR TO A
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CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN WHICH A DEFENDANT IS FOUND GUILTY.
HE'S ENTITLED TO A MITIGATION-AGGRAVATION HEARING.

THE COURT

WILL SCHEDULE SUCH AN EVENT FOR TOMORROW MORNING AT 10100
O' CLOCK.
ALSO, THE COURT IS INTERESTED IN ONE ABSTRACT QUESTION.
IT WOULD APPEAR TO THE COURT AT THIS TIME THAT THE EXACT
RULING AND DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF THESE FUNDS
MAY OR MAY NOT BE EXEMPTED AND THE EXTENT, THE WAY THEY WERE
EXEMPT, IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS TIME.

THE COURT HAS REFERENCE TO

THOSE SECTIONS OF THE STATUTE WHERE THEY TALK ABOUT REMEDIES
FOR CONTEMPT AND ONE IS TO MAKE THE PARTY WHO SUFFERED IT IN
THE CIVIL PROCEEDING WHOLE.
SUM IS AT THIS TIME.

THE COURT CANNOT TELL WHAT THAT

SO IF YOU WANT TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE

TOMORROW MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK ON THAT ISSUE, THE COURT
WILL HEAR IT.
THE COURT IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
CONTEMPT HEARINGS ^AGAINST ATTORNEYS CAN BE FAR-REACHING.

FOR

THAT REASON I THINK MR. MALOUF IS ENTITLED TO MEDITATE ON THIS
MATTER AND PRESENT WHAT HE HAS TOMORROW MORNING ON THAT ISSUE.
THIS PARTICULAR TRIAL WILL BE IN RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW
MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK.

LQ§9Nx_yiBH
THE COURT:
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UNDER THE NORMAL RULES IN SUCH MATTERS,

THE PLAINTIFF, PETITIONER, HAS A RIGHT TO PROCEED FIRST.

48

DO

1

THE COURT:

174
I'VE BEEN A JUDGE FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS, AND

2

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD A PROBLEM OF QUITE THIS

3

MAGNITUDE AS FAR AS MISCONDUCT OF AN ATTORNEY IS INVOLVED.
j

4

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
5

AND JUDGMENT HAVE TO BE PREPARED, AND I ASSUME THE PETITIONER
6

WILL DO THAT FOR THE COURT.

NOW, THESE FINDINGS ARE TO

7

CAREFULLY CITE THAT, FIRST, THAT THERE WAS A PROCEEDING
8

BROUGHT TO FORECLOSE A MORTGAGE ON HIS CLIENTS' FARM
9

PROPERTIES, AND THAT THIS IS, SO FAR AS THE COURT IS ABLE TO
10

ASCERTAIN, PROBABLY THE EVENT THAT BROUGHT ON THE PETITION
11

UNDER CHAPTER 11 IN BANKRUPTCY.
12

THAT NOTHING OCCURRED —

SECOND, THAT NOTHING OCCURRED IN

13

THAT PROCEEDING WHICH WOULD IN ANY WAY JUSTIFY MR. MALOUF IN
14

DRAWING ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM FUNDS AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME.
15

THAT EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE IS TRUE, HE WAS DENIED THAT
16

PRIVILEGE.
17

LATER THE CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY WAS CONVERTED TO A
18

CHAPTER 7.

THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RULINGS OF THE BANKRUPTCY

19

JUDGE THAT WOULD GIVE HIM ANY COMFORT INSOFAR AS MAKING A
20

CLAIM TO FEES AS FAR AS THE FUNDS ARE CONCERNED.

THE COURT

21

HAS EXAMINED THE SCHEDULE IN BANKRUPTCY AND CAN FIND NO
22

REFERENCE IN ANY WAY TO A SAVING OF *5,300 REFERRED TO
23

YESTERDAY.

YET IT'S —

EVEN IF I WERE TO ACCEPT WHAT HE'S

24

TOLD ME, THOSE FUNDS HAD NEVER BEEN CREDITED AS PAID AND WERE
25

STILL HELD FOR THEM.
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1

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE JUDGE, THE RESIDENT JUDGE DID

2

HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH THE FORECLOSURE AND

3

APPARENTLY DID SO AND APPARENTLY GRANTED A SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

4

THE TOTAL OF THE MATTER.

5

I CAN —

I INTERPRET THE ORIGINAL GARNISHMENT ORDER TO BE

6

CAPABLE OF ONE INTERPRETATION AND ONE INTERPRETATION ONLY, AND

7

THAT WAS A TOTAL HOLD.

8

HAVE TO ALLOW FOR EXEMPT PROPERTIES TO AUTOMATICALLY BE TAKEN

9

BEYOND THAT, BUT SO FAR AS THE COURT'S AWARE, THAT RULE

I'VE HEARD THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT YOU

10

APPLIES ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT'S INVOLVING WITH WAGE

11

EARNERS WHERE PART OF THE WAGES ARE EXEMPT FROM ALL

12

GARNISHMENTS.

13

BE SO INTERPRETED.

14

RESIDENT JUDGE'S ORDER IS UNAMBIGUOUS.

15

FIND THAT THE HEARING —

16

THAT THE TRANSCRIPT DISCLOSES THAT IT'S TOTALLY UNAMBIGUOUS.

17

IT CLEARLY IS A COMPLETE HOLD, WITH THE DISCRETION TO

18

DETERMINE ANY GARNISHMENT EXEMPTION WOULD BE THEN PLACED

19

BEFORE THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURT.

20

DO NOT INTERPRET THIS TO BE AMBIGUOUS IN ANY WAY.

21

IT'S CLEAR.

22

BUT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT IT OTHERWISE
IN OTHER WORDS, I THINK JUDGE —

THAT'S MY FINDING.

I

AT THE HEARING ON FEBRUARY THE 8TH,

I

I THINK

I THINK THE ORDER WHICH LATER FOLLOWED THE JUDGE'S METHOD

23

IS CLEAR THAT THIS IS UN —

24

IS NOT CAPABLE OF ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION.

25

THE

IT WAS A TOTAL HOLD ORDER AND IT

THE COURT FINDS THAT IN VIOLATION OF THESE ORDERS, SUMS
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THE FOLLOWING

1

HAVE BEEN PAID OUT IN THE AMOUNT OF •21,260.12.

2

ITEMS WERE PAID TO HIS CLIENT; AND THAT IS, 1,500, 300, THE

3

600, 1,500, AND THE 3,000.

THE FOLLOWING SUMS WERE DRAWN BY
»

4

HIMSELF SO FAR AS I CAN DETERMINE FROM THESE AMOUNTS; AND THAT
5

IS, 6,000, AND ONE THE THE 3,000S, AND THE 5,300 IS DRAWN BY
6

HIMSELF.

ACTUALLY HE DREW MORE MONEYS OUT THAN DID HIS

7

CLIENT.
8

THE COURT FINDS IT TO BE A FACT THAT THE DEFENSE IN THIS
9

MATTER HAS NOT BEEN IN GOOD FAITH.

THE COURT FINDS THAT IT IS

10

IN BAD FAITH.

THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUDDEN EXPLANATION

11

OF THE *5,300 IS TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE EARLIER
12

STATEMENTS AND REPRESENTATIONS THAT ALL OF THE MONEYS WERE
13

EXEMPT BECAUSE THEY CAME FROM THE MILK FUND, AND THEN IT'S

—

14

AND THIS —

AND THESE TYPE OF REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN

15

SUDDENLY IT COMES FROM A BRAND NEW SOURCE, AFTER THERE BEING
16

NO DISCLOSURE OF THAT EARLIER.
17

THE COURT CAN F4ND LITTLE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE AT ALL TO
18

SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THEIR DOES EXIST AND DID EXIST
19

EARLIER BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY STARTED A PENSION FUND
20

ARRANGEMENT.

I HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE THIS IS TRUE.

21

THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE DEFENSE IS PRIMARILY ONE OF
22

ATTEMPTING TO CAUSE A SMOKE SCREEN SO THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME
23

CLOUD ON THE MATTER, SO THAT IT COULD BE CONTINUED, NOT
24

BROUGHT TO A HEAD, AND COLLECTIBLE.

THE COURT BELIEVES THAT

25

THE DEFENSE IS IN BAD FAITH UNDER THE STATUTES.
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1
2
3

THE COURT SENTENCES AS FOLLOWS:

THE COURT GRANTS

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE TRUSTEE FOR *21,260. 12.
THE COURT GRANTS JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE OF

4

THE BAD FAITH DEFENSE.

5

SPENT ON ATTORNEYS' FEES MAY HAVE BEEN SPENT IN PART FOR OTHER

6

PURPOSES, BUT THE COURT HERE ASSESSES ATTORNEY FEES AT «£,200

7

AS A REASONABLE FEE.

8

PETITIONER ALONE, NOT THE TRUSTEE.

9

I THINK SOME OF THE MONEYS WHICH WERE

THIS JUDGMENT IS IN FAVOR OF THE

THE COURT SENTENCES HIM TO PAY A FINE OF *100 AND SERVE

10

30 DAYS IN THE COUNTY JAIL.

11

THE COUNTY JAIL TIME UPON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

12

ALL, HE MUST RETURN ALL SUMS WHICH HE STILL HOLDS REGARDLESS

13

OF HOW —

14

TRACEABLE FROM MONEYS DRAWN FROM THE —

15

NEXT, HE MUST ANSWER QUESTIONS TRUTHFULLY CONCERNING HIS

16

RESOURCES AND WHERE HIS FUNDS ARE AT THE TIME.

17

AN OPPORTUNITY TO D0 SO, SO THAT —

18

COLLECTION OF THE MONEYS.

19

QUESTIONS SO AS TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE WILL BE GIVEN TO HIM IN

20

15 MINUTES.

21

TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS.

22

THE COURT WILL SUSPEND 25 DAYS OF
FIRST OF

WHERE OR HOW THEY'RE INVESTED THAT ARE IN ANY WAY
FROM THESE ACCOUNTS.

HE 1 S PROVIDED

TO FACILITATE THE

THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER

YOU MAY ASK HIM ABOUT HIS RESOURCES, IF HE WANTS

THZ COURT WILL FIX THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION OF THE

23

SENTENCE AS IT WILL START ON THE 11TH DAY OF DECEMBER, THE

24

COUNTY JAIL, CACHE COUNTY, 9:00 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING.

25

COURT ANTICIPATES THAT THE COURT WILL HAVE BEFORE THAT TIME

CO

THE

1
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SIGNED THOSE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, SO THAT HE

2

WILL HAVE HAD THEM BY FIVE DAYS FOR A FULL —

3

DAYS BEFORE THAT JAIL SENTENCE STARTS.

4

AN APPEAL, THE COURT WILL FIX THE APPEAL BOND AT *1,000.

5

AT LEAST FIVE

IN THE EVENT THERE IS

COURT WILL BE IN RECESS 15 MINUTES, AND YOU SEE IF YOU

6

WANT TO ASK QUESTIONS AND IF HE WANTS TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AS

7

TO THE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR THE RESTORINIG OF THE FUNDS.

8

WILL BE IN RECESS

9

MR. MALOUFs

10

THE COURT:

11

—
I HAVE ONE QUESTION, YOUR HONOR.
YES.

THE COURT WILL ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS AS

TO ADDITIONAL FINDINGS EITHER SIDE HAS.

12

13

MR. MALOUF:

IF THERE IS AN APPEAL, WILL THAT STAY THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE JAIL TERM?

14

THE COURT:

15

TERM.

16

SUPERSEDEAS BOND.

ONLY IF YOU POST A BOND WILL IT STAY THE JAIL

IF YOU WANT TO STAY THE OTHERS, YOU WILL HAVE TO POST A
ARE THERE OTHER QUESTIONS?

17

MR. BROWN:

N O ^ YOUR HONOR.

18

THE COURT:

COURT WILL BE IN RECESS 15 MINUTES.

19
20
21

COURT

(WHEREUPON THE COURT TOOK A BRIEF RECESS-)
THE COURT:

DO YOU DO YOU WISH TO EXPLORE THE

POSSIBILITY OF RETURN OF FUNDS?

22

MR. BROWN:

YES, YOUR HONOR, I DO.

23

THE COURT:

DO YOU ELECT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS?

24

MR. MALOUF:

I ELECT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.

25

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

•M

DO YOU OR DO YOU NOT?

James R. Brown (#456)
Michael N. Zundel (#3755)
Wm. Shane Topham (#4425)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
370 East South Temple, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,

CONSENT TO EXTENSION
OF EFFECT OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
AND JOINT MOTION FOR ORDER
EXTENDING EFFECT AND
CONTINUANCE OF HEARINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B.
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al.

Civil No. 20842

Defendants.

Utah Farm Production Credit Association, by and through
its counsel of record, Michael N. Zundel, and Garth N. Labrum,
Duane B. Labrum, Ross N. Labrum, I. Lee Labrum dba Labrum Brothers,
a partnership, and the following individuals, Garth N. Labrum,

.-,,*•,

Duane B. Labrum, Ross N. Labrum, I. Lee Labrum, Lori^^^aErum,

f», by a „d^?/'

Kaye S. Labrum, Jane£^-ft7Labrum, and Lin
through

their

counsel

of

record,

Raymond

N.

Malouf,

hereby

stipulate and agree as follows?

1.

All of J:he above-named Defendants, do hereby consent

that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court against

^6

said Defendants on January 21, 1985 at the hour of 1:35 p.m., may
be extended to February 8, 1985, through the hour of 11:59 P.m. u~*

~>r-ofe^t

*^<£ fc> X^
2.

&Kb^^

~fh/£ Valid

J^t°

&&ys 7>*AA pz*\ £'>

Dtah Farm Production Credit Association consents to

the continuance of the hearings on its Temporary Restraining Order
and Order to Show Cause, previously scheduled for February 4,
1985/ to February 8f 1985 at the hour of 3:00 p.m., all as requested
by counsel for the above-named Defendants in order to accomodate
his schedule.

WHEREFORE,

Plaintiff

and

the

above-named

Defendants

jointly move this Court for an Order extending the effect of the
Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued, to February 8,
1985, at the hour of 11:59 p.m. and an Order continuing the
hearing of Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and this Court's Order to Show Cause from February 4, 1985 to
February 8, 1985 at the hour of 3:00 p.m.

DATED this

day of January, 1985.

,OUF
150 East 200 North, #1
Logan, Dtah 84321
Attorney for Defendants Labrum

^ S S L ^ ^

'MICHAEL N. ziaNDErr

JARDINE, LINEBAUOH, BROWN & DUNN
370 East South'Temple, Suite 401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,

ORDER EXTENDING EFFECT
OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND CONTINUING
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
AND HEARING ON
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
GARTH N. LABRUM, DUANE B.
LABRUM, ROSS N. LABRUM, et al.

Civil No. 20842

Defendants.

Upon consideration of the Stipulation and Joint Motion

4L

of the Plaintiff and the Defendants herein, whereby the Defendants
restrained by that certain Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on January 21, 1985 have consented to the extension
of the effect of said Temporary Restraining Order to February 8,
1985r to the hour of 11:59 p.m., and good cause appearing thereforf it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore
issued by this Court on January 21, 1985, at the

hour of 1:35

p.m., is hereby extended andf doopite its termsf shall not expire
until February 8/ 1985/ at the hour of 11:59 p.m.; and it is
further

ORDERED,
Preliminary

that

Injunction,

the hearing
previously

'•]

of Plaintiff's Motion for
scheduled

for

Februarv^4/ ^

jsZ

1985f at the hour of 9:00 a.m.f is hereby continued and shall .be _~
^SJ

o n .i

377

! /

&

I

heard on February 8, 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m.; and it is
further

ORDERED, that the Order to Show Cause previously issued
by this Court on January 21, 1985, ordering all of the Defendants
in the above-entitled case, except Federal Land Bank, Hyrum Feed,
and New Holland Equipment Agency, to appear and show cause on
February 4, 1985, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. is hereby modified so
that said Defendants are hereby ordered to appear and show cause
on February

8, 1985, at the hour of 3:00 p.m., at the Courthouse

of the District Judge, Logan, Utah, then and there to show cause,
if any they have, why this Court should not order turnover of the
Milk Diversion proceeds to Utah Farm Production Credit Association.

DATED this .?J|. day of January, 1985.
/

BY THE COURT:h
i

I

/

/

VeNoy Chri/fetoffepson
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORMs
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

In re

)

THOMAS A. KERR,

)

Debtor.

Bankruptcy Case No* 84C-03028

)

GORDON M. MCCLEAN, SR.,
Debtor.

)

Bankruptcy Case No. 84C-01280

)

GORDON M. MCCLEAN, JR.f
Debtor.

)

Bankruptcy Case No. 84C-01279

)
)

Appearances:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R. Kimball Mosier, Mosier, Straley & Doxey,

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Thomas A. Kerr; Michael A. Katz,
Garrett & Sturdy, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan Association; Carl J. Nemelka, Salt Lake City,
Utah, for

Gordon M. McClean, Sr. and Gordon M. McClean, Jr.;

Roger G. Segal, Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt Lake City, Utah,
for himself as trustee.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before the Court are three contested matters which have been
consolidated to consider

common issues of law concerning whether

or not these self-employed debtors 1 interests in their Keogh
retirement plans are excluded or exempt from their bankruptcy
estates.
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The Kerr Case
Thomas A. Kerrr a practicing dentist, filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 7 on November 6, 1984.

The

principal assets listed on his bankruptcy schedules are two Keogh
retirement accounts totaling $77,000.00.
funds

in

the plans

as exempt

The debtor claimed the

pursuant

to Utah

Code Ann,

§ 78-23-5(3).
Kerr

first

established

contributed to it for 18 years.

a Keogh

plan

in 1964 and

has

In August 1984, Kerr deposited

his retirement funds into an "'H.R. 10' Keogh Retirement Plan and
Trust," Account No. 489982, and designated Zions First National
Bank as Trustee.

The plan is qualified under ERISA.

The plan

contains a clause which prohibits a participant or beneficiary
from alienating or assigning any benefit provided under the
plan.l
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association

("Deseret

Federal") was listed on the debtor's A-3 Schedule as a creditor
having an unsecured claim in the sum of $250,000.00.

1
Paragraph 8.05 of the Trust Agreement provides:
Assignment or Alienation.
Neither a
Participant nor a Beneficiary shall assign or
alienate any benefit provided under the Plan,
and the Trustee shall not recognize any such
assignment or alienation.

The claim
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arises out of a judgment against the debtor entered by the Third
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on
March 29, 1983,

Deseret Federal filed an objection to the

debtor's claim of exemptions on February 6, 1985.

The objection

was heard on March 28, 1985 and taken under advisement.
The McClean Cases
Gordon McClean, Sr. and Gordon McClean, Jr., father and son,
each filed a petition for voluntary relief under Chapter 7 on May
10, 1984.

Both debtors are self-employed chiropractors.

The

only assets with recognized values listed in their bankruptcy
schedules filed pursuant to Section 521(1) and Bankruptcy Rule
1007(b)

were

wearing

apparel, ski

ERISA-qualified pension plans.

equipment,

and

certain

McClean, Sr. listed an E.F.

Hutton Keogh plan with a value of $56,000.00, and McClean, Jr.
listed two plans with an aggregate value of $33,651.12.

Funds in

the plans were claimed as exempt property by the debtors on
Schedule B-4 pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4003(a).

The trustee

questioned each debtor about the plans at the Section 341 meeting
held on June 11, 1984.

On July 9, the trustee filed objections

to the debtors' claimed exemptions.
memoranda

of

law

December 7, 1984.

and

an

evidentiary

The parties submitted
hearing

was

held

on
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At the hearing, the trustee offered and the*Court received
in evidence

Gordon

McClean

Jr.'s

Keogh

Account/

entitled

•'Colonial Profit-Sharing Retirement Plan and Trust for SelfEmployed Individuals."
the

Internal

Revenue

The plan qualifies under Section 401 of
Code

for

self-employed

individuals.

Ronald L. Tressler, an account executive with Prudent ial -Bache,
testified that the Keogh account set up for Gordon McClean, Jr.
had funds on deposit in the amount of $33,351.12.
Meidell, an account executive with

E.F. Hutton

Mark J.

& Company,

testified that the McClean pension plans were established as
ERISA-qualified

Keogh accounts. 2

The debtors were granted

leave to join E.F. Hutton & Company and Prudential-Bache in this
proceeding, but apparently have declined to do so.

2
Mr. Meidell appeared and testified pursuant to a subpoena
issued by the Court at the trustee's request which directed
him to bring any documentation related to the McClean
accounts. He testified that the documents were in New York
and were being sent to him. The Court directed Meidell upon
receipt of the documents to turn them over to his attorney
and instructed him to inform counsel for the trustee and the
McCleans. To date counsel have neither moved to supplement
the record with the documents relating to the plans or to
reopen the hearing for the purpose of introducing additional
evidence based upon the documents. Therefore, the Court
considers the record closed and shall decide the matter on
the basis of the evidence presently before it.
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DISCUSSION
Debtors' attempts to keep their pension plan funds^ out of
the bankruptcy estate have resulted in increasing litigation and
much discussion by courts and commentators^ in recent years.
Judicial resolution of these cases involves the interpretation of

Although a wide variety of pension plans exist, there are
four general categories.
The first is the traditional
defined-benefit pension plan, which provides for a guaranteed
benefit after retirement, and is usually connected to some
portion or percentage of the worker's salary. The second
category is the defined-contribution plan, which simply
operates to provide certain contributions to a special
retirement account during the employee's stay with the
employer. The third category of pension plan, the Keogh
plan, is limited to use by self-employed persons, and is
usually controlled and administered by the self-employed
individual. Keogh plans are established pursuant to the
Keogh-Smathers Act, Pub.L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962)
(codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code). The final category consists of individual retirement
accounts ("IRAs").
Note, The Fate of ERISA-Qualifled
Pension Plans Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 Win.
Mitchell L.Rev. 1045 n. 2 (1985).
See, e.g. , Note, Contra Goff: Of Retirement Trusts and
Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2), 32 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 1266-1331
(1985); Note, The Fate of ERISA-Qualified Pension Plans Under
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, Comment, Retirement Plan Assets:
The Retention Rights of an Oklahoma Debtor in Bankruptcy, 20
Tulsa L.J. 589-604 (1985); Wohl, Pension and Bankruptcy Laws:
A Clash of Social Policies, 64 N.C.L.Rev. 3-36 (1985); Note,
The Individual Debtor's Interest in ERISA Benefits: Is It
Property of the Estate? Is It Exempt" 1 Bkrtcy .Dev „ J.
293-316 (1985); Note, Corporate Pension Plans as Property of
the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 Mmn.L.Reve 1113-1134 (1985); Note,
Exemption of ERISA Benefits Under Section 522(b)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 214-236 (1984); Wemtraub &
Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: In Re Goff -- Keogh
Plans and IRAs as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 16
U.C.C.L.J. 264 (1984) .
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ambiguous

statutory

language

in

the

Bankruptcy

Code

and

<

conflicting policy objectives which exist between the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Code.
Basically/ debtors have urged courts to exclude or exempt
pension funds on three grounds.

First, they argue that such

funds are excluded property under § 541(c)(2).

Second, they

argue that ERISA-qualified pension plans are exempted under
§ 522(b)(2)(A).

Third, where, as in Utah, a state has "opted

out" of the federal exemptions, debtors look to the state
exemptions act.

Each of these positions has been raised by the

parties in these proceedings.
I.
Property of the Estate and the § 541(c)(2) Exclusion
Section

541(a)

provides

that

a bankruptcy

estate

is

comprised of "all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case."

Congress intended

the scope of § 541(a)(1) to be very broad and to expand the reach
of the bankruptcy estate beyond what had existed under the former
Act.

United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 103

S.Ct. 2309, 2313, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983).
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, property of the estate had
been defined in terms of transferability and leviability.
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979).

11

See 3 REMINGTON ON
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BANKRUPTCY § 1178, at 9-11

(J. Henderson rev.,ed. 1957)o

A

two-part test was applied to determine whether property passed
into the bankruptcy estate:

At the date of filing the petition,

could the property have been (1) transferred by the debtor?; or
(2) levied upon and sold by judicial process against him, or
otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered?

If neither one of

these conditions was met, the property was excluded from the
estate.

4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 70.15 [2], at 137 (14th ed .

1978).

The primary objective of § 70(a)(5), former 11 U.S.C.

§ 110(a)(5), was "to secure for creditors everything of value the
bankrupt may [have possessed] in alienable or leviable form when
he file[d] his petition."

Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379,

86 S.Ct. 511, 15 L.Ed.2d 428 (1966).
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, however, all property of the
debtor comes into the estate upon the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.

After the property comes into the estate, the debtor

may claim certain exemptions under § 522.

S. Rep. No. 95-989,

95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, p. 5860.

Section 541(c)(2) creates an exception

to the broad inclusion of all of the debtor's property in the
bankruptcy estate.
restrictions

on

It provides that certain property subject to
alienation

which

are

enforceable

"under
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applicable
estate*5

nonbankruptcy law" n e v e r becomes p r o p e r t y of

the

Matter of Reagan, 741 F.2d 9 5 , 97 (5th C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) .

The i s s u e of whether an ERISA-qualified plan f i t s within the
terms of the § 5 4 1 ( c ) ( 2 )

exception

that there

exemption** in the Bankruptcy Code which

is a federal

i s complicated

by the

5
Section 541(c)(2) states:

6

A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial
interest of the debtor in a trust that is
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy
law is enforceable in a case under this
title.
Section 522(d)(10)(E) provides:
The following property may be exempted under
subsection (b)(1) of this section:
•

*

*

(10) The debtor's right to receive —
(E) a payment under a stock bonus,
pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract on account of illness,
disability, death, age, or length of service,
to the extent reasonably necessary for the
support of the debtor and any dependent of
the debtor, unless —
(i) such plan or contract was
established
by or
under
the
auspices
of
an
insider
that
employed the debtor at the time the
debtor's rights under such plan or
contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of
age or length of service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does
not qualify under section 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26
U.S.C. 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408,
or 409).

fact

Page 9
84C-03028
84C-01280
84C-01279
appears to apply more specifically to ERISA.

Matter of Jones, 43
i

B.R.

1002 f

1005

(N.D. Ind. 1984).

Since

§ 522 (d) (10) (E)

specifically refers to pension plans and profit-sharing plans, it
is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended that such
benefits were to be first brought into the estate and then
claimed as exempt by the debtor.
Courts have interpreted

§ 541(c)(2) in two ways.

The

liberal view, typified by the decision of the court in In re
Threewitt, 24 B.R. 927, 9 B.C.D. 1225, Bankr.L.Rep.

(CCH)

II 69,020, 8 C.B.C.2d 890 (D. Kan. 1982) holds that since ERISA
spendthrift

restrictions

are enforceable

against

creditors

The significance of this federal exemption on the question of
whether pension rights are subject to exclusion under
§ 541(c)(2) has been the subject of considerable disagreement
among the courts. Compare In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268, 1272
(8th Cir. 1984) (presence of § 522(d) (10)(E) suggests that
Congress did not intend § 541(c)(2) to be a broad exclusion
which would keep debtors' entire ERISA benefits out of
estate) and Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1982)
(from coexistence of § 522 (d) (10) (E) and § 541(c)(2) it may
be inferred that Congress did not intend to exclude pension
funds from becoming property of the estate) with McClean v.
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
762 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1985) (§ 541(c)(2) is a more
narrowly focused provision that excludes from the estate
some, but not all, of the employment benefits which, if
included in the estate property, might then be subject to
exemption under § 522(d)(10)(E)) and Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d
574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983) (given that § 522(d)(10)(E) is much
broader than § 541, court may consider whether pension plan
qualifies as a spendthrift trust under state law). See also
In re White, 47 B.R. 410 (W.D. Wash. 1985); In re DeWeese, 47
B.R. 251, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,340, 12 C. B.C. 2d 404
(Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1985); Matter of Cook, 43 B.R. 996, 1000
(N.D. Ind. 1984).
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outside of bankruptcy, then they are enforceable against the
bankruptcy trustee*

Courts adopting this view point out that the

actual language of the statute does not limit the exclusion to
spendthrift trusts.

See, e.g. , Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In

re Phillips) , 34 B.R. 543, 544-45, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 69,566
(Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. 330, 331, 10
B.C.D. 760, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) % 69,355, 8 C.B.C.2d 912 (Bkrtcy.
D. Colo. 1983).

These cases are based on a broad reading of

§ 541(c)(2) as including all trusts with assignment and transfer
restrictions recognized in general federal nonbankruptcy law.
Matter of Nichols, 42 B.R. 772, 775 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1984). The
Threewitt line of cases rest their holding that pension funds are
excluded from the debtor's estate under § 541(c)(2) on three
grounds:

(1) that the statute does not explicitly use the term

"spendthrift trust"; (2) that under nonbankruptcy law a debtor's
interest in an ERISA-qualified plan is beyond the reach of his
creditors; and (3) the § 522(d)(10)(E) exemption for pension and
profit-sharing plans actually "overlaps" § 541(c)(2) rather than
indicating

that

ERISA

funds

were

intended

as part

of the

bankruptcy estate which could then be exempted under § 522(d)
(10)(E).

Matter of Berndt, 34 B.R. 515, 518-19, Bankr.L.Rep

(CCH) 11 69,467, 9 C.B.C.2d 848 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ind. 1983).

See,

e.g. , In re Holt, 32 B.R. 767, 10 B.C.D. 1267, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH)
11 69,353 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Pruitt, 30 B.R. at
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331-32; In re Threewitt, 24 B.R. at 929-30; In ,re Rodgers, 24
B.R. 181, 182-83, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) f 68,880 (Bkrtcy. D. Ariz.
1982); In re Ralstin, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 71,184 (Bkrtcy. D.
Kan. 1986); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons, 34 B.R. at 545; In re
DiPiazza,

29

B.R.

916, 10

B.C.D. 618, Bankr.L.Rep.

1! 69,226, 8 C.B.C.2d 654 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 111. 1983).

(CCH)

Under these

decisions, the debtor's interest in a qualified pension plan
would always be excluded from the estate.

In re El sea, 47 B.R.

142, 147 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
The majority position, however, based primarily on the
legislative history of § 541(c)(2), and on § 522 (d) (10) (E) , is
that anti-alienation and nonassignability clauses in qualified
pension plans do not prevent the debtor's interest from coming
into the bankruptcy estate.

In re Elsea, 47 B.R. at 147. See,

e .g. , In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert, denied
Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 106 S.Ct. 1199 (1986); In
re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Graham, 726
F.2d at 1268; In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 574; Regan v. Ross, 691
F.2d at 81; In re Goldberg, 59 B.R. 201, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH)
11 71,068 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Okla. 1986); In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. 606
(Bkrtcy. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re McKenna, 58 B.R. 221 (Bkrtcy.
N.D. Iowa 1985); In re White, 47 B.R. 410 (W.D. Wash. 1985); ^11
re DeWeese, 47 B.R. 251, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,340, 12 C.B.C.2d
404 (Bkrtcy. W.D. N.C. 1985); In re Nichols, 42 B.R. 772, 776
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(Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1984).

In cases involving pension plans such

as these, the courts have treated the debtor's interest in the
plan as a beneficial interest in a trust.
at 147.

In re Elsea, 47 B.R.

The question then arises as to what Congress meant in

Section 541(c)(2) by the words "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
under which the debtor's interest in a retirement trust may be
excluded from the estate.

ERISA is codified partly in the

Internal Revenue Code and partly in Title 29 of the United States
Code, and it contains anti-alienation provisions in each.

It

provides that a pension plan can qualify only if it includes a
restriction on transfer of the beneficiary's interest.

These

statutes do not specifically require a "spendthrift" restriction
that prohibits creditors from using garnishment, attachment,
execution or other process to collect the beneficiary's debt
directly from the administrator of the pension plan. However, the
rule has developed that a spendthrift restriction is required and
is enforceable against creditors. Id. at 146-47, citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13); 26 C.F.R. § 1 . 401(a)-13;
United States v. Buha, 623 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1980).
The majority and trend position, particularly among the
appellate courts, is that the reference in Section 541(c) to
"applicable

nonbankruptcy

law"

concerning spendthrift trusts.

applies

only

to state

law

See, e.g. , In re Daniel, 771 F.2d

at 1360; In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490; In re Graham, 726
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F.2d at 1271; Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at 582; In re Crenshaw, 51
B„R. 554, 556-57, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 71,009 (N.D. Ala. 1985);
Matter of Cook, 43 B.R. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ind. 1984); SSA
Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. Bizon, 42 B.R. 338, 341-42 (D.
Md. 1984); In re O'Brien, 50 B.R. 67, 73, 13 B.C.D. 97, 12
C.B.C.2d

1161

642,

(Bkrtcy.

78,

644

(Bkrtcy.

Bankr.L.Rep.

S.D.

E.D. Va.

1985);

Fla. 1985);

In r e G i l l e t t ,

46 B.R.

In r e R i d e n o u r , 45 B.R.

(CCH) \\ 7 0 , 1 7 2 , 11 C.B.C.2d 1086 ( B k r t c y .

72,
E.D.

Tenn. 1984); Matter of Jones, 43 B.R. at 1006; In re Huff, 42
B.R. 553, 556, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 70,038 (Bkrtcy. N.D. 111.
1984); Matter of Berndt, 34 B.R. at 515; Matter of Kelley, 31
B.R. 786, 788, 10 B.C.D. 1457 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1983); In re
DiPiazza, 29 B.R. at 918.
This position enjoys support from the legislative history.
Subsection (c) invalidates restrictions
on the transfer of property of the debtor, in
order that all of the interests of the debtor
in property will become property of the
estate. The provisions invalidated are those
that restrict or condition transfer of the
debtor's interest, and those that are
conditioned on the insolvency or financial
condition of the debtor, on the commencement
of a bankruptcy case, or on the appointment
of a custodian of the debtor's property.
Paragraph (2) of subsection (c), however,
preserves restrictions on transfer of a
spendthrift trust to the extent that the
restriction is enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
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H.R.

Rep. No.

95-595, 95th

Cong. , 1st

Sessj. 369

(1977),

reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 6325.

The

Senate Report similarly states that § 541(c)(2) "preserves
restrictions

on a transfer

of

a spendthrift

trust

enforceable [under] nonbankruptcy law" but the Senate bill to
which the report relates, S. 2266, would have limited the extent
to which such property would be excluded from the estate to that
"reasonably necessary" for the support of the debtor and his
dependents.
reprinted

S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1978),

in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5869.

Congress adopted the House version and rejected the narrower
position taken in the Senate version "with respect to income
limitations on a spend-thrift trust."

124 Cong. Rec. S. 17, 413

(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong.
Rec. H. 11,096

(daily ed/ Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep,

Edwards) (emphasis added).

Therefore, this Court joins in the

position of the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts
of Appeals that pension plans will be excluded from property of
the estates only if they are enforceable under state law as
spendthrift trusts.
The Utah Supreme Court has not indicated whether or not
spendthrift trusts are valid in Utah to any extent, but has
stated that there is a presumption against the creation of a
spendthrift trust unless either words to that effect are set
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forth, or the clear and undoubted intention is manifested by the
terms

of

the

trust

instrument.

Cronquist

v. Utah

State

Agricultural College, 114 Utah 426, 201 P.2d 280, 284 (1949).

In

general, a spendthrift trust is one in which the beneficiary is
prohibited from anticipating or assigning his interest in or
income from the trust fund.

Id. at 282.

(Second) of Trusts § 152(2) (1959).

See Restatement

In Leach v. Anderson, 535

P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court invalidated as a
fraudulent conveyance a purported spendthrift trust, wherein the
entire trust res was committed to maintaining the settlor.
The Utah cases cited suggest that Utah would follow the
traditional view and hold that restrictions on alienation will
not be enforced against creditors if the trust is self-settled,
that is, if the settlor and beneficiary of the trust are the same
person.

See 4 G. Bogert, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 233

(2d ed. 1966); 2 A. Scott, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156 (3d ed. 1967);
E. Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 474, at 543 (2d ed. 1947);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 156(1).

Accordingly, this Court

concludes that the debtors' pension plans do not constitute valid
spendthrift

trusts under Utah

law and, therefore, are not

excludable from property of the estate under § 541(c)(2).
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II.
Exemption of the Debtors1 Pension Funds Under § 522(b)(2)(A)
Having determined that the pension funds are not excluded
from the property of the estate under § 541(c)(2), the Court must
next consider whether they are exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A)*

That

subsection permits the debtor to claim as exempt the property
allowable under the state exemption ais well as any property that
is exempt under federal law other than the alternative federal
exemptions listed in § 522(d).

In re Stewart, 32 B.R. 132, 136,

11 B.C.D. 27, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) H 69,342 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1983).
The House and

Senate Reports on § 522(b)(2)(A) provide an

illustrative list of property that can be exempted under federal
laws:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability
payments, 22 U.S„C. 1104; Social security
payments, 42 U.S.C. 407; Injury or death
compensation payments from war risk hazards,
42 U.S.C. 1717; Wages of fishermen, seamen,
and apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601; Civil service
retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729, 2265;
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act death and disability benefits, 33
U.S.C. 916; Railroad Retirement Act annuities
and pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L); Veterans
benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); Special pensions
paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of
Honor, 38 U.S.C. 3101; and Federal homestead
lands on debts contracted before issuance of
the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175.
S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5861; H.R. Rep. No.
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9 5 - 5 9 5 , 95th Cong. , 1st S e s s . 360 (1977), reprinte/3 in 1978 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, p . 6316.
In Graham, t h e d e b t o r argued t h a t t h e p l a n ' s

prohibition

a g a i n s t a s s i g n m e n t and a l i e n a t i o n required by ERISA? and by the
Internal

Revenue Code** in o r d e r t o q u a l i f y

t h e p l a n for t a x

purposes, made h i s i n t e r e s t in the plan "property t h a t i s exempt
under F e d e r a l l a w . "
Reports

on

illustrative
federal

The Court noted t h a t the House and Senate

§ 522(b)(2)(A)
list

each

contained

a

non-exclusive

of p r o p e r t y which might be exempted

l a w s , but r e j e c t e d

t h e view t h a t ERISA p l a n

should be included.
While the above l i s t was not meant t o be
e x c l u s i v e , we find the f a i l u r e of Congress t o
i n c l u d e ERISA plan b e n e f i t s p r o b a t i v e of
C o n g r e s s i o n a l i n t e n t t h a t ERISA was not a
" F e d e r a l law" upon which a § 5 2 2 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A )
exemption could be b a s e d . See In re Goff,
706 F.2d a t 585. 'Furthermore, although the
p r o v i s i o n s of some of t h e s t a t u t e s on t h e
l i s t c r e a t i n g a federal exemption are s i m i l a r
to the a n t i - a l i e n a t i o n p r o v i s i o n of ERISA,
t h e r e i s a conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n between the
property exempted by the l i s t e d laws and t h e
p r o p e r t y covered by ERISA. The p e n s i o n s ,
wages, b e n e f i t s and payments included in t h e
i l l u s t r a t i v e l i s t are a l l p e c u l i a r l y federal
in n a t u r e , created by federal law or r e l a t e d
t o i n d u s t r i e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y protected by the
f e d e r a l government. In sharp c o n t r a s t , ERISA
r e g u l a t e s p r i v a t e employer pension systems.
We thus conclude, as did t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t ,
[In r e Goff, 706 F.2d a t 586] t h a t Congress
7
8

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
26 U.S.C. § 401(a).

under

benefits
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did not intend to include ERISA plans within
the other "Federal law" exemption of § 522*
726 F.2d at 1274.

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned similarly in

Lichstrahl:
Congress knew of the much-debated and
comprehensive statute when it issued the
House and Senate reports on § 522(b)(2)(A) in
1977 and 1978, and yet it did not include
ERISA in those reports. Matter of Goff, 706
F.2d at 585; see also In re Graham, 726 F.2d
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984).
Congress,
however, did refer to ERISA in other sections
of the Bankruptcy Code.
Of particular
importance is ERISA's inclusion within the
alternative federal exemptions listed in
§ 522(d). The failure to mention ERISA in
connection with § 522(b) was intentional.
Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at 585.
Furthermore , excluding ERISA-qualif ied
pension plans from the list of property
exempted under federal law is consistent with
an important distinction between exempted
property and property covered by ERISA.
Despite the similarity between the antialienation provisions of ERISA and some of
the listed statutes, the "pensions, wages,
benefits and payments included in the . . .
list are all peculiarly federal in nature,
created by federal law or related to
industries traditionally protected by the
federal government. In sharp contrast, ERISA
regulates private employer pension systems."
In re Graham, 726 F.2d at 1274. It is this
"peculiarly federal nature" shared by the
cited statutes that identifies and determines
which federal statutes are to be included
within the "other federal law" exemption of
§ 522 and which, like ERISA, are to be
excluded. See Matter of Goff, 706 F.2d at
586.
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750 F.2d at 1491. Accord, Matter of Goff, 706 F.2<? at 585; In re
Daniel , 771 F.2d at 1361; In re White, 47 B.R. 410, 412-13 (W.D.
Wash. 1985); In re Gillett, 46 B.R. 642, 644 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla.
1985).

Although the issue is not free from doubt, and while it

would be highly desirable from a policy standpoint if Congress
were to address the issue and not leave it to the courts to draw
inferences from Congressional silence, this Court is inclined to
follow the reasoning of Goff and Lichstrahl, and reject that of
In re Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233, 9 B.C.D. 769, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH)
11 69,066, 7 C.B.C.2d 323 (Bkrtcy. D. Kan. 1982).

In this regard

it is perhaps significant that Congress chose not to deal with
the issue in the 1984 Amendments, suggesting it did not disagree
with the interpretation given § 522(b)(2)(A) by a majority of the
courts.

This Court therefore holds that the debtors' interests

in their retirement plans are not exempt under § 522(b)(2)(A) as
"other federal law."
III.
Exemption of the Debtors' Pension Funds Under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3)
In 1981, the Utah legislature decided to "opt out" of the
federal exemptions by enacting the Utah Exemption Act.

See

generally

32,

In

re

Neiheisel,

32

B.R.

146,

11

B.C.D.
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Bankr.L.Rep.

(CCH) K 6 9 , 4 4 0

( B k r t c y . D. Utah 1?983) •

Section

78-23-6(3) provides:
[A]n i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to exemption of
the
following
property
to
the
extent
r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y for the support of the
i n d i v i d u a l and h i s dependents:
*

*

*

(3) Assets held, payments, and amounts
payable under a stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan
providing benefits other than by reason of
illness or disability.
The language of this exemption is drawn from Section 6(a)(5)
of the Uniform Exemptions Act, which in turn was derived from
Section

522 (d ) (10 ) (E) of

the

Bankruptcy

Code

and

Section

4-503(b)(6) of the bankruptcy bill proposed by the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
these

debtors1

retirement

plans

but

It clearly applies to
is

limited

to

funds

"reasonably necessary for the support of the [debtor] and his
dependents."

What is "reasonably necessary" under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-23-6(3) is clearly a question of fact requiring a further
evidentiary hearing.

Factors which the Court may consider in

determining what is reasonably necessary for the support of each
debtor and his dependents will include, without limitation, the
debtor's age, health, future earnings capacity, and necessary
expenditures.

See In re Kochell, 26 B.R. 86, 87, 9 B.C.D. 1329,

Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) 11 68,942 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Wis. 1982), aff *d 31
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B.R. 139 (W.D. Wis. 1983), afffd 732 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1984); ^B
re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 680, Bankr.L.Rep. (CCH) % 68,049, 4
C.B.C.2d 1099 (Bkrtcy. S.D. N.Y. 1981).

C0NCL0SI0N
The purpose of personal
two-fold.

bankruptcy

under

Chapter 7 is

First, it provides a mechanism for the liquidation of

the debtor's estate for the satisfaction of creditors' claims.
Second, by means

of

the discharge

and

application

of the

exemption provisions, it relieves the debtor from his debt
burdens

and

gives

him

a

"fresh

start. "3

The

exemption

provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are the product of much debate
and compromise by Congress, and reflect two not necessarily
inconsistent, but certainly different philosophical purposes.
The first object of any exemption scheme is to provide the debtor
with the minimum amount of property necessary to retain his
dignity

and

discharge.

to

attempt

self-rehabilitation

following

his

The second purpose behind exemption laws is to set a

ceiling on the maximum amount of property which a debtor should
be permitted

to retain before infringing on the reasonable

9
See Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the House Subcomm.
on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., Ser.
No. 27, Pt. 2 at 768 (1976) (statement of Prof. Philip
Shuchman).
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interests of creditors in that property. 10 The unwillingness of
Congress

to

provide

a blanket

exclusion

or

exemption

of

retirement funds suggests a balancing of these purposes.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that the
debtors'

pension

plan

funds

constitute

property

of

their

respective estates not excluded by operation of § 541(c)(2).

The

funds are not subject to exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(2)(A)
under

"other

federal

law,"

but

are

exempt

to

the

extent

reasonably necessary for the support of the debtors and their
dependents under Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-6(3).
Counsel for Deseret Federal shall prepare an appropriate
order in the Kerr case and the trustee of the estates of Gordon
McClean, Sr. and Gordon McClean, Jr. shall do likewise in those
cases.

The foregoing memorandum opinion constitutes the Court's

findings of fact and conclusions of law under Bankruptcy Rule
7052.
DATED this 1st day of August, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
10
Id. Pt. 3 at 1658 (statement of L.E. Creel III, representing
the Dallas Bar Association).
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COUNTY OF CACHE

"
JCIE m ^

478933

\
/
m

vs.
iABRmHaoraro^

\
(

Defendant

t

eyo

CORRECTED

Certificate of Sale of Real
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STATE OF UTAH,

County of Cache
Sidney P. Groll
I,
.
Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court,
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the
( 774,550.35 )
sum of
.........-......—«-•
.~>~..-~..»——.
Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Five Hundred F i f t y end 3 5 / 1 0 0 — - p r r r x x i r e
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L_
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^&SSti^SJ!&£E&S&BL.
all theright,title and interest of the said defendantS., in and to the
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East 50 rods, South
80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 6, Tcwnship 14 North, Range 1 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 300 feet,
thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet, thence South 300
feet to the point of beginning.
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And 1 further certify that the said property was soil in
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Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East 50 rods, South
80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 300 feet,
thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet, thence South 300
feet to the point of beginning.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CACHE
?HE FEDERAL LAND DANK OF SACRAMENTO
CORRECTED
?Vata>\& |

Certificate of Sale of Real

vs.
tABRUM BROTHERS,

et a l . ,

Estate

UNDER FORECLOSURE

C i v i l No. 23479
Defendant^ ,
STATE OF UTAH,
County of Cache

'•}•

I,
?}Q?L]j-.f^}}
Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that under and by virtue of the final Judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court,
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the
( 774,550.35 ) *
sum of
—•
.•
... •,.,„.l,,,l.L_.i._
geygn Hundred Sc T enty Four Thousand Five Hundred F i f t y and 3Sf\00
TxyiZXRS
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of

on the

day of

!**£

r ,„,.

.

* *

A. D. 19J£L, after due and legal notice, I sold at

Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to J M J ! g ^ ? S i J f i ? ? . 0 . ? 5 ^
J2LSS5S252
_

who was the highest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of I § L 5 9 9 J L 9 1 M

Fifty-Five Thousand

DOLLARS,

which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by . ? * £ . • S ^ S S L l S l ^ , .
^JBank o f Sacramento^

^ ^ ^

tMe

^

telcrcft

rf

^

§M d r f c n d a n t

s, m ^ to the

real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet more or less along the
state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28 chains
East of the Southwest O o m e r of Section 3, Township 14 North,
Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Iferidian, said beginning
point being the eastern most point along the state highway of
Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage dated September 5, 1979
recorded September 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256, pages
772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet;
thence South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning.

STATE OF UTAH
Ice

<

COUNTy''.:' CACHE m

473935

FILEOV^"™
mcHAEL '
COUK.'t ? v
6*. i)t?

And I further certify that the said property was sold in
lots parcels, as follows:

IIED

• 5A

One

or

Beginning at a point East 1162*66 feet more or less along the state
highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28 chains East of the
Southwest Corner of Section 3, Tcwnship 14 North, Range 1 West of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said beginning point being the eastern most
point along the state highway of Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage
dated September 5, 1979 recorded September 13, -;1979 as Entry No. 426615,
Book 256, pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West
200 feet, thence South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of
beginning.

and that the same is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute
in *uch cases made and provided Dated at

toy

of

Logan, Utah

7th

A. D. 19

Deputy §&?£*;£.

o

in

J
s

o
©

^2.

u
0
V

8,

Ur IHt SlAIfc Oh UJAH, IN AND HJK IHt

COUNTY OF CACHE
THE FEDERAL LAND BANK OF SACRAMENTO
Plaintiff

**
UBRUM BROTHERS, *

\

.

.

(

Certificate of Sale of Real
E s t a t e U n ( j e r Foreclosure
C i v i l No. 23479

Defendant
STATE OF UTAH,
County of Cache

7*0

CORRECTED

.

\
i

473335

h

I,
^ ^ ^ L J ^ i
Slicriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court,
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby 1 was commanded
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much tlicreof as might be necessary, according to law, and
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the
sum oft ~

(774,550.35 )
......J.
:,...

....

Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand ^ive Hundred Ftfff^^
11, i
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of

1810 676 89 ^
..
'.........!..Z.J.

Eight Hundred Ten Thouaand f i x Hundred Seven^^
on the

1$L day of

J^J

ft1tg.

A. D. 19 J 5 L . after due and legal notice, I sold at

Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to ...lS§...?^era.l.#Land..Dank
Of .SaorameatQ.

who was the hichest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of Sttll*lt:*l

*

Four Hundred Eighty Nine Thouaand Six Hundred Seventy Six §Sl.89^10^:rlx)LLATO;
which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by 2 6 & . E ^ ? 3 ^ J s i K d - . ^ ? 1 ^
M ..Qf M JSacranentO

all the right, title and interest of the said defendant.?., in and to the

real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit:

Parcel 1, (Cornish farm) Beginning at a point on the East line of the O.S.L.
railroad 8.28 chains East of the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of
Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and running thence North 3 55' West 20 chains; thence East .38 chains; thence
North 3 55,' West 20 chains, more or less to the North line of the Southwest
Quarter of Section 3; thence East 33.01 chains, more or less to the Northeast
oorner of said Southwest Quarter of Section 3; thence North to the South bank
of Bear River; thence Southeasterly and Southerly along said South bank of
Bear River to a point North 87°55' East 371.75 feet from a point 12.75 chains
South fran the Center of said Section; thence South VT55% West to a point
33 feet East of said North and South cgntor line; thence South 168 feet; thence
South 25°East 282 feet thence South 5 East 254 feet; thence West 1C0 feet
to a point 1043 feet North of the South Quarter corner of said Section; tlience
South 25 feet; thence South 45° West 160 feet; thence West 254 feet; thence
South 288 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South 100 feet; thence West 139
feet to a point 521 feet North of a point 759 feet West of the South Quarter
corner of said Section; thence South 339 feet; thence
West 191 feet; thence
South J49 feet; thence West along State Highway 1162.66 feet to the place of
beginning, containing 154.84 acres, excepting any portion of the above described
property lying within the State Highway.
Less the following (Cornish House); Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet
rrpr? ot less along the state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8 — 8
chains East of the Southwest Corner of Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 1
West of the Salt Lake Base and rieridian, said beginning point being tho eastern
most point along the state highway of Parcel 1 as described in a mortgage

BOOK

354 PACE546

dated September 5, 1979 recorded Septeiifcer 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256,
pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet; thence South
149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning.
Pare*'1 2, (Ross labrum farm, less house).
Part of the Southeast quarter of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows*Beginning at a point 464 feet West of
the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 6, and rurtning thence West
2176 feet, more or less, to the Northwest c o m e r of the Southeast quarter of said
Section 6; thence Ijuth 80 rods; thence East 50 rods; thence South 80 rods; thence
East 97,33 rods; t h ^ e e North 471 feet; thence East 209 feet to the Section line; thence
North 1869 feej; to h point 300 feet South of the Northeast c o m e r of the Southeast quartci
of said SectioK 6; thence West 464 feet; thence North 300 feet to the place of beginning.
Less the following (Ross Labrum House): Beginning 2640 feet West, South 80 rods, East
50 rods; South 80 rods, East 300 feet from the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter
A n d 1 further certify that the said property w a s soli* in

lots or parcels, as follows:
Three Parcels/One lot
of Section 6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
running thence East 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence West
300 feet, thence South 300 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 4, Part of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 6, Township
14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows:
Beginning at a point 262 feet North of the Southeast Corner of said Section 6, and
running thence West 209 feet; thence North 209 feet; thence East 209 feet to the East
line of said Section 6; thence South 209 feet to the place of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH: (a) 124 shares West Cache Irrigation Company stock, (b) 16 shares of Cub
River Irrigation Company stock, (c) four wheel-move sprinkler irrigation systems with
movers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances and approximately 30 feet of 6" portable
mainline and approximately 870 feet of 8" portable mainline a s f w h e r e is.
and that the same is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute

Logan, Utah

in such cases made and provided Dated at
May

of.

....JL

-r-**.

7th

4 this

......:

day

.A.D,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE

COjmOFJACHE
jn*L^^

47Q936

\

L' ° °

_ I

vs.
LABKUM BROTHERS,

CORRECTER

' \

Certificate of Sale of Real

(

Estate Under Foreclosure

et ai.,
Defendant

STATE OF UTAH,
County of Cache

)

C i v i l No. 23479

"h

Sidney P. Groll
I,
Sheriff of Cache County, State of Utah, do hereby
certify that under and by virtue of the final judgment and decree of the said First Judicial District Court,
heretofore duly made, rendered and entered in the above entitled cause, and of an order of sale duly issued
therein and to me duly directed and delivered as Sheriff of said Cache County, whereby I was commanded
to sell the property hereinafter described, or so much thereof as might be necessary, according to law, and
to apply the proceeds of such sale towards the satisfaction of the judgment in said action, amounting to the
( 774,550.35 )
sum of
•—1.,rn-rirf.,.Seven Hundred Seventy Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 35/100DOLLARS,
with interest, counsel fees, taxes, and costs of suit, amounting in all to the sum of...
Eight Hundred Ten Thouaand Six Hundred Seventy Six and 89/100—
on the

7th

day of ~

May

(810,676.89 )

r.~~TDOIXXRSt
85
A. D. 19 ^ after due and legal notice, I sold at

Public Auction, according to the statute in such cases made and provided, to J 3 ^ § . . . ? ^ € ^ . . . ^ ! ) d . . ^ ! ^
J^LSiSSSSSSSS

who was the highest and best bidder therefor, for the sum of 3SSSL998J&

Tto.Hffl.foed^

DOLLARS,

which was the highest and best sum bid, and which was the whole price paid by JS^JEEHSS^rSS?.
«. * H * JSL^SH!5SdSL
all the right, title and interest of the said defendant?., in and to the
real estate described in said order of sale, described as follows, to-wit:

Parcel 3 (Dairy and approximately 70 acres)
Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast Corner of Section 6,
Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running
thence South 47 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod; thence West
18 rods; thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 8 rods
to the South line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said
Section 6; thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 158 rods
to the point of beginning.
Together with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Company stock, and
(b) one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinker irrigation line, approximately
1320 feet in length, with movers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances,
Serial No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet of 6" portable mainline as is,
where i s .

COUNTY OF CACHE
FllED&raCORDEDFOR

Jai 5 WiiWft
MIGilAELl i'-tEO
COUHlYRCOO'DER
BV DEFi/H

y\

And 1 further certify that the said property was sol.) in ...53!®.

~~

~

lots or parcels,, as follows:

Beginning at a point 2 rods West of the Northeast corner of Section 6,
Ibwnshlp 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and
running thence South 47 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod;
thence West IB rods; thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence
South 8 rods to the South line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast
quarter of said Section 6; thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods;
thence East 158 rods to the point of beginning.
Tbgether with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Ccmpany stock, and
(b) one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinkler irrigation line, approximately
1320 feet in appurtenances, Serial No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet
of 6" portable mainline, as is, where is.
and that the samtf is subject to redemption in lawful money of the United States pursuant to the statute
I tliis J.Q.

in such cases made and provided. Dated at

May

of . _

, A. D. 19.

Sheriff
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SHERIFFS DEED
ON ORDER OF SALE
Uris3ftfc»t»»,

*•*<*

One Thousand Nine Hundred and

I*

day of

gjfr*y-Five

5 = 2 L

, between .

Sidney P. Groll

Sheriff of

County, State of Utah, the party of thefirstpart and

The federal Land Bank of Sacramento

the parti

of the second part Witnessed!.

WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court of the
*****
on thf

Judicial District, in and for the County of ^dae
^ k

day of

in said Court, wherein

iff^

(

$ t t t e ^ Utah,

\f&.—, in a ©main action then pending

V&J&32U4SUS&

0* .Sacramento

. and Ivan Boyce Lafaran, Ann N.Utoin, Labium Brothers Partnership, Clair

plaintiff

A.Marler, JoAnn S. Marler,_Wayne T. Marler? Itelanle M.llarler, Labium Brothers Ranch,
'I^rim*^tha^7T2brW"fet^^
Agri-Tech Inc.,
d e M

1

Ic^witM^de»Se9r^S?dLca

^

Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sheriff, for execution and among other things
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the
Sheriff of said County o f . —

in the manner required by law and according to the

course and practice of said Court; that such sale be made in the said County of

25™

,

between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties to said action might become purchaser
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser
AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff did. at the hour of

SiiSS

at such sale, and

as required by law.
*M. on t b e - ! £

after due public notice had been given as required by
law, duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House. to~-JteXNkJGA&X-—--.
in said County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and hereinafter described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to J^§J^terali^cJLBank^of
J^aH!!!^
$55,000.00 ^ ^ ^ ^ F m y j l v ^ T t o u s a n d

for the sum of
DOLLARS;

the? . being the highest and best bidder ~ therefor, and said sum being the highest and best sum bid.

AND WHEREAS, the aaid Sheriff thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of said
tale and delivered one thereof to

the aaid purchaser

Cache

Itifr Tft»fr™l I*nd Bank of Sacramento

, and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of aaid

_

County.

AND WHEREAS, aix months after aaid aale hare expired without any redemption of the aaid
premises having been made,
NOW, THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH.
Sidney P. Qroll

That the aaid
the Sheriff afomaid. by virtue of the aaid premises

and aaid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Same inrachcase made and provided, for and in consideration of the said sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the aaid p»rty. . of the second
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, told, conveyed and confirmed,
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm anto the said p»«* J

of the second

part, and to

~ * L . heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the aaid

defendant s

Ivm Boyoe_ Latoin, Ann N. Latanci, Lahnp Brothers Partnership, Clair

A Mfvplfff'i Joann S. Marler, Wayne Y. larler, Helanie It. Marler, Labnxn Brothers Rancl
Labnm Brothers, Labron Brothers Dairy, Hymn feed and Bardware, Agri-Tech, Inc.,
Brobkffeld Products, Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United states ox America
had. on the aaid2&— day of
certain lot

, piece

MX

.

19^5

. ©f. in and to all th?

, or parcel.JBL of land, situate, lying and being in the a a i d . ^ 5 ^

County, State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, go»wit:

Beginning at a point Bast 1162.66 feet more or less along the state highway fran
n. point on thp Q.S.L.itenTmd R.9* ^ 1 n ° Ff "t o* the Southwest Oorner of Section
3, Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt lake Base and Meridian, said
hfttfinniTyr jrsint y*ripg the eastern taost point along the state highway of Parcel 1
as described in a mortgage dated September 5, 1979 recorded Septenber 13, 1979 as
lEnfrvy w^ A<X&\fi Twfr 2fifi pngft« 77a»T7S, *nA umP^E thence North 149 feet, theno
West 200 feet: thence South 149 feet: thence Bast 200 feet to the point of
Beginning.

TOGETHER with all and singular the tenements, hereditament*, and appurtenances, thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining
TO HAVE AND HOLD, tbe said premises, with tbe appurtenances, unto the said pan_£
their

the second part.

of

heirs and assigns forever, u fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can

may, or ought to. by virtue of tbe said Order and Decree, and of tbe statute in such case made and provided
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of thefirstpart, has hereunto set his hand the
day and yearfirstabove written.
Signed and delivered in tbe presence of

SidwO-

Royal A. Crockett, Deputy

Sheriff of

(toll

GftCbe

County, State of Utah.

STATE OF UTAH, I M
County of Cache ) "*
On this

7 t h

me the within named
Sheriff of

day of
gjg*?

Novwfaer
P

*

A. D. 19B5

personally appeared before

Qpo11

County, State of Utah. Known to me to be the person described in and whose

name is subscribed to the within instrument and be

SlOPey—lJ£2
..duly acknowledged to me that be as such Sheriff of

..
said

Cache

County, executed the same

^?&VX4? $ * fflTb^&CV
RoyaltA. Crockett
Notary Public.
Rmdu,* «

* » • > . **•»»

My ccnmWon « p i m _ 2 t l * ^

.

S H E R I F F S DEED
ON ORDER OF SALE
7th
<U»3ftfostar*, *****——
One Thouaand Nine Hundred and

„„t
"**

Novwber

A

JBgfaff-**ye

(

^ ^ ^

Sidney P. Qroll

Sberiff of

™£H?

County. Stat* of Utah, the party of thefirstpart and

Ihe Federal Land Bank of Sacramento

the pattJL~ of the second part Witnesteth:
WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court of the„
Fir

g L _ Judicial District, in and for the County of J?!£**!

on t b e _ £ ~ ~ L

ff

day of

•r^ ^,..

. State of Utah,

!9f5—.. in a certain action then pending

in said Court, wherein __-JDbltJEtta^^

plaintiff

_

and J m J ° m J # & r ^ ^

A. Uarler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F, liarler, lielanie M. iiarler, Labnm Brothers
Ranch* iabrmJBrctiker^^^
Md HftTJteare, Agri-Tech I
Biookfield Products,Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of America
defendant 5 . _ , and of which said judgment and decree, a certified copy, with an order of sale from said
Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sberiff, for execution and among other things
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the
Sheriff of said County of

Carhft

m

, i n the manner required by law and according to the

course and practice of said Court; that such sale be made in the said County of

9*£*!l

_

,

between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties so said action might become purchase
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser
AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff did. at the hour of
day of

~—~

U.tP°

A

T

at such sale, and

as required by law.

- M. on the..,.?? 0

10^*5 .. after due public notice had been given as required by

law. duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House, in

*£R&.G!&L_.

m gaid County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and hereinafter described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to ^ 0 ^ « L I ^ O a ^ L j 2 L - .
Sacramento
_
for the sum of
$50,000-00

Fifty-Thousand

.

, _—

, DOLLARS;

they . being the highest and best bidder . therefor, and said sum being the highest and best sum bid.

AND WHEREAS, the ttid Sheriff thereupon made and tamed the naval certificate in duplicate of aaid
aale and deUvertd one thereof to

the aaid pnrchaaer
<***

'a*

Federal

Lapd

**"* <* Sacramento

, and cawed the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of aaid
County.

AND WHEREAS, fix months after aaid aale have expired without any redemption of the aaid
premiaes having been made,
NOW. THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH.
Sidney P. Qrol3

That the aaid

. the Sheriff aforeaaid. by virtue of the aaid premises

and aaid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consideration of the aaid sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the aaid part_X

of the second

part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed.
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the aaid party
part, and toJ&£&£.

of the second

heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the said

defendant & J ? a £ „ B p J ^ J ^ m „

A.

Ifarlwr, . M t m S . liftTltir, Tayn* T_Hurler, Ttel.M* y Ite-rlgr, Tarrrun Urm-hPty four*,
LabniB .BrjDjthexs*Jj0ami.^St3m^X^^4. BftTP .ItoeflLiiPd Hardware, Agri-Tech., Inc.
Brookfield Products, Inc., First Securitv Bank at Idaho, United States of America
had. on the aaid 7th . day of
Bay «• _
1991 , of, in and to all th.
certain lot

, piece——. or parcel^acx- of land, situate, lying and being in the safe?**?.

County. State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning 2640 feet West. South. 80 rods. East 50 rods, South. 80 rods, East
300 feet from the Northeast corner ot the Southeast Quarter of Section 6,
Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Late Base and Meridian, and
running thence East 300 feet, thence North 300 feet, thence West 300 feet,
thence South 300 feet to the point of beginning.

,_

TOGETHER with all and singular the tenement*, hereditament*, and appurtenances, thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining.
TO HAVE AND HOLD, the said premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parti
the second part.

of

t h ^ T . . heirs and assigns forever, as fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can

may. or ought to. by virtue of the said Order and Decree, and of the statute in such case made and provided.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of thefirstpart, has hereunto set his band the
day and ytatfirstabovt written.
Signed and delivered in the presence of

Royal A. Crockett, Depaty

8K
Sheriff of

. Qroll
P****:

County. Sute of Uuh.

A.D. IS§L-

personally appeared before

STATE OF UTAH, |
County of Cache J
On this.

7th.

. day of

me the within named .

_ & & 6 V P, QTPll-

Sheriff of

County, Sute of Uuh, Known to me to be the person described in and whose

Cache

name is subscribed to the within instrument and he

g i t e V P> GTOII
rf"ly acknowledged to me that he as such Sheriff of

said ...Qghg

County, executed the same.

4^L<7*f'Csfip*
Bpyal ft.

Hyron, Utah

Noury Public.

Residing at .
My commission expires

2^bl2T2*L

SHERIFFS DEED
ON ORDER OF SALE
7th.

CJa« Znbtidurt, «•*««,
One Thousand
and
and Nine Hnndrtd
Hnndrcd and

™

liffiffi^1?6

. „ * Novsriber

day*.

, between.

Sidney P. Groll

QaCD

Sheriff of

^

County. State of Utah, the party of thefirstpart and

The Federal Land Bank of Sacramento

the part.X_ of the second part Witnesseth:
WHEREAS, by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Conn of the
F i T S t _ judicial District, in and for the County of
on thf

^tk

day of

1

JP ^

'.

Qafi&fi

t

State of Utah,

19S5—, in a certain action then pending

in said Conn, wherein - ^ F e d e r ^ L J ^ O a n f c . O f ^ a C T M n a o t Q

pontiff
*and l 9 f i JssssJ^QBbLJBiLlLu Ufcxum, JLatafnJBrattesJBar^^
O a r l e r , JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F. Marler, llelanie M. Marler, Labrum Brothers
Ranee, Labnm Brothers^ Labrm Brot^gry pftflyy, Vyrim Tfrftfl pnri HaTrhmre, Agrt JIW*h Inc.
Brob^ieTdl^raEcts" inc.*, First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of Anerica
defendant6. , and of which said judgment and decree, a certified copy, with an order of ale from said
Court was delivered to said party of the first part, as such Sheriff, for execution and among other things
it was therein ordered, adjudged and decreed that all and singular the mortgaged premises described in the
complaint in said action, and specifically described in said decree should be sold at Public Auction by the
Sheriff of said County of -., £*&*&

in the manner required by law and according to the

course and practice of said Court: that such sale be made in the said County of

&Sb§

.

between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and five o'clock in the afternoon on such day as said
Sheriff should appoint; that any of the parties to said action might become purchase!!— at such sale, and
that said Sheriff should execute the usual certifiates and deeds to the purchaser
AND WHEREAS, the aid Sheriff did, at the hour ciUlSB.
^ y cf

_"** ,

as required by law.

^ L _ M . on t h e J ^

_

19?~L... after due public notice bad been given as required by

law. duly sell at Public Auction, at the front door of the County Court House, in

lGgft&.£it£.~-

m said County, agreeable to said decree, the premises in said decree described, and hereinafter described, and at which said sale said premises were sold to ~2k§-Eg3&a2 J^jLBan&..p_f—
.???5^i?
$210,000.00

- ... T ^ Hundred and Tten Thousand r n

for the sum of
—

DOLLARS:

t he y . being the highest and best bidder .. therefor, and said sum being the behest and best sum bid.

AND WHEREAS, tbe Mid Sheriff thereupon made and isroed the nsual certificate in duplicate of said
tale and dehmed one thereof to

tbe said purchaser

The federal Land Bank of Sacramento

, and canaed the other to be filed in the office of tbe County Recorder of said .

ex,

_*£*

AND WHEREAS, aix months after said sale have expired without any redemption of the said
premise* hairing been made,
NOW, THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH:
. . .

That tbe said

Sidney P, QroU

the Sheriff aforesaid, by virtue of the said premises

and aid Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consideration of tbe aaid sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the said partX— of tbe second
part, the receipt whereof u hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed.
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the aaid party
part, and to

of the second

.tte^beirs and assigns forever. all the right, title, interest and claim which the said

defendant a^Iyap-Boyce Jflhrum, ..AmilLULsi&raa^l^
A. Marler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne ?. Iterler, llelanle H. Marler, Labnxs Brothers
Rajick, J-ahrtziLBrothfirs^.^^
Dnirv. Hvran feed and Jartware, Agri-Tech.,
Inc., Brookfleld Products, Inc., First Security Bank of Idaho, United States of Amer
had. on the saidJLtL- ^y
certain lot-

, piece

of

lta£

+

,193$L-. of, in and to all th.

—

, or parcelJDL. of land, situate, lying and being in the aid Ql*£be

County. State of Utah and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit:

Parcel 3 (Dairy and approximately 70 acres)
Bft|dMHng «t » pMn+ •> ™vte Wret nf +h» nn.rthopgt nprner of Section 6. Township
14 North, Ranee 1 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence
South 47'rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 1 rod; thence West 18 rods;
thence South 24 rods; thence West 10 rods; thence South 8 rods to the South
line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 6;
thence West 118 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 158 rods to the point
of beginning.
_
-__-«-=______
Together with: (a) 9 shares of Cub River Irrigation Oanpany stock, and (b)
one AM Manufacturing Wheel-Move sprinkler irrigation line, approximately 1320
feet in length, with rovers, sprinkler heads, wheels and appurtenances, Serial
No. 5038, and approximately 2130 feet of 6" portable mainline as is, uhere is.

TOGETHER with all and singular the tenements, hereditamenu. and appurtenances, thereunto belonging, or in anywise appertaining.
TO HAVE AND HOLD, the aaid premises, with the appurtenances, onto the said party
the second part.

their jKjn

and

of

„^gnt forever, as fully and absolutely, as he. the said Sheriff, can

may, or ought to, by virtue of the aaid Order and Decree, and of the statute in such case made and provided.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of thefirstpart, has hereunto set his hand the
day and yearfirstabove written.
Signed and delivered in the presence of

Sidng> p . Qroll

Royal A. Crockett, Deputy

Sheriff of J * S * «

County. State of Utah.

STATE OF UTAH. (
County of Cache )
On this

7th

day 0 f

NgVWber

A . D. 19f£L. personally appeared befort

me the within named

Sidney P. Qroll

Sheriff of

County, State of Utah, Known to me to be the person described in and whose

Cache

.

name it subscribed to the within instrument and he ~

Sidney P. QroP

.

..duly acknowledged to me that he as such Sheriff of
said

v^^

County, executed the same

RoyaU
>3W A .^Crockett
Notary Public.
Residing at J & n m j J D t a h
My commission expires

„ _ _ _ „

Qlh^*£J%L,

"2SB1SPD

STL,

-^^SAr

Sheriff- of ^

W

**EREAS.

,a

»»<f C o m *

.

oy

_

.

^

~*~~—-«B53E3L«

*• J'fcriSr"fiS-&Ui Bow* T t

*( tJ * front door of tK. r>

~~~^

-___

""•*-—---___

"* **** fi*e«

%J*« and h~. .

e

-—~_

AND WHEREAS, the said Sheriff thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of said
sale and delisted one thereof to The F e d e r a l Land Bank o f Sacramento

the said purchaser

, and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County Recorder of said

C****

County.

AND WHEREAS, six months after said sale hare expired without any redemption of the said
premises having been made,
NOW. THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH:

Sidney P. Groll

That the said
the Sheriff aforesaid, by virtue of the said premises

and said Order of Sale and in pursuance of the Statue in such case made and provided, for and in consideration of the said sum of money, to him in hand paid as aforesaid, by the said party

of the second

part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, conveyed and confirmed.
and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the said party

of the second

part, and t o — . t h e i r — heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, interest and claim which the said

defendant s _ ^ Y * g J * P 7 ^ . ^ * ! ^ „ 4 ^ ^
Brothers Partnership, Clair A.
Marler, JoAnn S. Marler, Wayne F. Marler, Melanie M. Marler, labrum Brothers Ranch,
Labron Brothers, Latoum Brothers Dairy, Hymn feed and Hardware, Agri-Tech., Inc.
Bra^ielSProaucts, Inc.T"HrsT'5ecurlty'Bami5^^
tailed Sut«b uf America
had. on the said
certain lot

£th ^ y

. piece

of

May

19£L_, of> fa i n d

to

,n ^

, or parcel.**- of land, situate, lying and being in the said—jCtlGbg

„

County. State of Utah, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit:

Parcel 1, (Cornish faun) Beginning at a point on the East line of the O.S.L. railroad
8.28 chains East of the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3,
Township 14 North, Range 1 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
t hence North S 0 ^ ' lest 20 chains; thence East .38 chains; thence North 3°55' West
20 chains, more or less to the North line of the Southwest Quarter of Section 3;
t hence East 33.01 chains, more or less to the Northeast corner of said Southwest
Quarter of Section 3; thence North to the South bank of Bear River; thence Southeasterly and Southerly along said South bank of Bear River to a point North 87°55'
East 371.75 feet from a point 12.75 chainsSduth firm the Center of said Section;
thence South 8^55' West to a point 33 feet East of said North and South center line;
thence South 168 feet; thence South 25°East 282 feet thence South S'East 254 feet;
thence West 160 feet to a point 1043 feet North of the South Quarter comer of said
Section; thence South 25 feet; thence South 45 u West 160 feet; thence Jlest 254 feet;
thence South 288 feet; thence West 250 feet; thence South"100 feet; thence West 139
feet to a point 521 feet North of a point 759 feet West of the South Quarter corner
of said Section; thence South 339 feet; thence West 191 feet; thence South 149 feet;
thence West along State Highway 1162.66 feet to the place of beginning, containing
154.84 acres, excepting any portion of the above described property lying within the
State Highway.

Less tbe following (.Cornish House): Beginning at a point East 1162.66 feet m
or less along the state highway from a point on the O.S.L. Railroad 8.28
chains East of the Southwest Corner of Section 3, Township 14 North, Range 1 1
of the Salt lake Base and Meridian, said beginning point being the eastern m a
point along fly stf +* M a * — * of Parcel 1 a*riefyxibedin a mortgage dated
September 5, 1979 recorded September 13, 1979 as Entry No. 426615, Book 256,
pages 772-775, and running thence North 149 feet, thence West 200 feet; thenc*
South 149 feet; thence East 200 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 2, (Roes~Labr\in farm less houseT Part of the Southeast quarter of Se<
6, Township 14 North, Range 1 East of the Salt Lake Base ancTBeriaian, agscru
as follows: CSee Attached Sheet)
TOGETHER with all and singular tbe tenement*, hereditaments, and appurtenances, thereunto bi
longing, or in anywise appertaining
TO HAVE AND HOLD, tbe said premises, with tbe appurtenances, unto the said part_£
the second part,

e

t h e i r — heirs and assigns forever, as fully and absolutely, as be. tbe said Sherif. ca

may, or ought to. by virtue of the said Order and Decree, and of tbe statute in such case made and providec
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Sheriff, the said party of thefirstpart, has hereunto set his hand th

-i*P^-f

day and yearfirstabove written.
Signed and delivered in the presence of
•

1

Royal A. Crockett, Deputy

STATE OF UTAH, (
County of Cache )
7th

On this

me the within named
Sheriff of

e

C*Ch

(
/

Sidney P. Qroll

^ ^
Sheriff of —y*5SE

eu

County, State of Utah

"*
day of

5°*5*!?E

. A. D. 19§L_ personally appeared befon

Sidney P. Qroll
County. Sure of Utah, Known to me to be tbe person described in and who*

name is subscribed to tbe within instrument and he

:__£.—*
me tnat ne as such &nen

said

S

County, executed the same.
Notary Public.
Residing at Jfimil), ITfJltl
My commission expires .

Qft=l&=S?.

